关键词: 投资效率, 退出威胁, 治理效应

Abstract: The role of outside blockholders in corporate governance has always been the focus of academic and practical circles. Taking exit threat as a starting point, this paper investigates the mechanism of external major shareholders’ influence on enterprise investment decisions. The empirical result shows that: (1)The outside blockholders’ exit threat effectively promotes the corporate investment efficiency, and one standard deviation plus in exit threat increases 3.941% of investment efficiency. (2)The governance effect of outside blockholders’ exit threat is mainly dependent on management’s concerns about the risks of its own holdings of wealth and pledge of stock rights. (3)Long-term outside blockholders’ exit threat plays a more significant role in governance, while short-term outside blockholders' exit threat does not play a significant role.

Key words: investment efficiency, exit threats, corporate governance effect