关键词: UGC, 媒体平台, 内容创作者, 广告投放

Abstract: In UGC media platforms, content generators upload the content they produce, and consumers watch it through the platform. Along with the advancement of communication technology, these types of platforms have grown rapidly in recent years. In the UGC media market where there are multiple content generators and different types of consumers, we compare and analyze the revenue of the platform and content generators under three advertising modes: advertising by the platform, advertising by content generators and advertising by both. This paper explores the selection conditions of different advertising modes, and the effects of the number of content generators and the time-critical features of consumers on the level of advertising between platforms and content generators, and the level of content production efforts of content generators under different advertising modes. This paper expands the discussion on the mode of advertising in UGC platforms, and supplements the research related to the mode of advertising by content generators in the platforms, with a view to providing certain operational management suggestions for UGC platforms.
By constructing the Salop circular city model, a monopolistic UGC media platform is assumed to exist in the market, and consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit circular city of overall size 1. In the hypothetical UGC media platform in this paper, the main source of revenue for content generators is the revenue sharing of the platform and advertising revenue; the main source of revenue for the platform is the network externalities brought to it by consumers and advertising revenue. The model is solved by the inverse solution method and the equilibrium solution is further analyzed by applying numerical analysis.
The main finding of this study is that UGC media platforms are able to generate the most revenue for themselves in the advertising model, which is the main source of revenue for the platforms, and that the platforms can increase their revenue level by advertising wisely; while content generators do not always prefer the advertising model because too much advertising means that content generators may have to make more efforts to retain consumers, which can lead to a significant increase in costs for content generators. In addition, this study concludes that: 1)the increase in the number of content generators in the platform will reduce the motivation of content generators and the level of revenue for content generators; while the platform always wants more content generators to join, which will lead to higher revenue for the platform; for consumers, the increase in the number of content generators means that the quality of content they watch will be lower and the number of ads they need to watch will be lower. 2)The increase in time-based consumers may reduce content generators' incentive to create; as leisure-based consumers decrease, content generators or platforms may need to increase the level of advertising to compensate for the loss caused by the decrease in potential consumers; both platforms and content generators prefer to have more leisure-based consumers in the market, which will bring them higher revenue. 3)Platforms always get the best benefit from their own participation in advertising models. When consumers have a low level of aversion to advertising by content generators, platforms may allow content generators to advertise alongside their own advertising, while when consumers have a high level of aversion to advertising by content generators, platforms prefer a model in which only they advertise.
In the further study, this paper tries to consider the endogenous situation of revenue sharing between platforms and content generators. In addition, this paper assumes a fully covered monopoly market, and the situation when the market is not fully covered or when there is competition deserves further examination.

Key words: UGC, media platforms, content generators, advertising