关键词: 目的地品牌, Nash, Stackelberg, 成本分担契约, 决策

Abstract: Collaborative development of destination branding enhances the core capabilities of a region. While much research has focused on stakeholder collaboration in tourism destinations, relatively little attention has been paid to supply chain collaboration in destination branding. In this study, we construct a differential game model for the cooperative game between scenic spots and tourism enterprises in the process of destination branding. We obtain the optimal trajectory of brand building efforts, destination brand competitiveness and supply chain profits for different decision contexts. Furthermore, we compare and analyse the brand building efforts and supply chain profits of these two entities under different decision scenarios. Finally, we use MATLAB to simulate and validate the results. We draw several important conclusions.
(1)The brand competitiveness of the tourism destination under the centralised decision mode is significantly higher than that of the simultaneous and master-slave decisions, and the total profit under the centralised decision is 72.20% higher than that of the simultaneous decision and 63.54% higher than that of the master-slave decision; The brand competitiveness under the centralised decision scenario is 112.77% and 98.02% higher than that of the simultaneous and master-slave decisions, respectively. In the process of tourism destination brand building, cooperation between upstream and downstream in the tourism supply chain is an effective way to improve brand competitiveness.
(2)Profit sharing between scenic spots and tourism enterprises has no effect on the overall profit of the supply chain under centralised decision making, but has a greater effect on simultaneous decision making and master-slave decision making, and has a threshold effect on the overall profit under simultaneous decision making mode; with the increase of profit sharing ratio, the overall profit of the supply chain increases, but when it reaches a certain level, the overall profit of the supply chain tends to decrease.
(3)Different decision models show that the brand building efforts of scenic spots and tourism enterprises can significantly contribute to the improvement of destination brand competitiveness; The natural decay rate of brand competitiveness has a negative impact on brand competitiveness; Changes in the initial value of brand competitiveness do not affect the stable value of destination brand competitiveness. In addition, the coefficient of influence of the degree of brand building efforts of scenic spots and tourism enterprises on the overall profit of the destination supply chain has a positive influence on the overall profit of the supply chain; with the continuous upgrading of consumption, the coefficient of influence of brand competitiveness on the overall profit of the supply chain increases, and the promotion of brand competitiveness on the overall profit of the supply chain becomes more prominent.
Through a cooperative and non-cooperative game analysis, we have explored the destination brand cooperation behavior of tourism supply chain enterprises and expanded the multi-stakeholder perspective in destination branding research. The research findings can provide strategy guidance and participation suggestions for stakeholders engaged in destination brand building. However, this study also has limitations, as local governments and residents play a significant role in the process of destination branding. Future studies will aim to expand our research to analyze the contributions of local governments and residents to destination brand building.

Key words: destination brand, Nash, Stackelberg, cost sharing contract, policy decision