运筹与管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 98-104.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2025.0082

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

平行进口下考虑溢出效应的制造商促销决策研究

张冲1, 宋君1, 王海燕2, 马余良1   

  1. 1.南京邮电大学 管理学院,江苏 南京 210003;
    2.东南大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-19 出版日期:2025-03-25 发布日期:2025-07-04
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071042);江苏省研究生科研创新计划资助项目(KYCX22_0866)

Research on Manufacturer’s Promotion Decision Considering Spillover Effects under Parallel Imports

ZHANG Chong1, SONG Jun1, WANG Haiyan2, MA Yuliang1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2023-03-19 Online:2025-03-25 Published:2025-07-04

摘要: 在非对称市场环境中,平行进口给制造商带来了负面影响,实际上制造商可以通过促销努力应对平行进口问题。在平行进口的背景下,考虑制造商不进行促销努力和进行促销努力两种决策情形,基于消费者效用推导各情形下市场需求状况,给出了制造商和平行进口商在不同情形下的均衡决策与利润,以及平行进口的存在条件,分析促销努力溢出效应对制造商促销努力以及供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明:当平行进口活跃时,制造商无溢出的促销努力能改善制造商的利润,且充足的促销投资能抵制平行进口行为;当促销努力溢出时,促销努力对制造商利润的改善效果受到溢出率的影响,在促销努力溢出率的阈值内相应增加促销投资则能提高制造商的利润,在溢出率超过一定阈值后,受到溢出效应的限制,进一步增加投资并不能带来更多利润。

关键词: 平行进口, 促销努力, 溢出效应, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Parallel import is a form of importation where non-authorized distributors acquire products through legitimate channels and directly enter the domestic market for sale. There is often a significant price difference between asymmetrical markets for the same product. Parallel imported goods can meet the demand of consumers in high-priced markets for lower-priced products. However, parallel imported goods may suffer from devaluation due to issues such as lack of after-sales services and certification. Active parallel imports severely harm the interests of manufacturers’ authorized distribution channels. In reality, the manufacturer can counter parallel import behavior through promotion efforts. Promotion activities such as advertising and sales services are believed to enhance brand image and awareness, improve consumer perception and satisfaction in the consumption process, and increase consumer recognition and trust in products sold through authorized channels. However, in asymmetrical markets with parallel import activities, the manufacturer’s promotion investments often have spillover effects. This means that the manufacturer’s promotion actions not only increase the sales of authorized channels but also lead to an increase in consumers purchasing parallel imported goods.
This study combines parallel imports and promotion efforts to investigate the impact of promotion efforts with spillover effects on parallel import behavior and supply chain performance. The following questions are addressed: (1)Can manufacturer’s promotion efforts suppress parallel import behavior? (2)Considering the spillover effects of promotion efforts, how should the manufacturer adjust their decisions? (3)Under what conditions can manufacturer achieve optimal promotion efforts and profits when parallel imports are active? Consider a manufacturer selling the same product in two markets simultaneously. Market 1 is a low-end market with consumers having a lower willingness to pay, while Market 2 is a high-end market with consumers having a higher willingness to pay. Due to factors such as geographical location and information asymmetry, consumers in both markets are unable to directly purchase goods from the other market. However, parallel importers can sell products from Market 1 to Market 2.To counter parallel import behavior, the manufacturer can implement promotion efforts in Market 2.Considering that the manufacturer’s promotion efforts have spillover effects, it not only improves its own sales but also benefits parallel importers. Based on this, this study considers five scenarios.
This paper combines parallel imports and promotion efforts to examine the supply chain model of a single manufacturer selling a product in both high-end and low-end markets. The following conclusions are drawn: (1)Parallel import behavior erodes the manufacturer’s profits but enhances their pricing power in the low-end market. (2)When parallel imports are active, promotion efforts without spillover can improve the manufacturer’s profits, and sufficient promotion investment can counteract parallel import behavior. (3)When promotion efforts have spillover effects, increasing promotion investment within the threshold of the spillover rate can enhance the manufacturer’s profits. Different from existing research, this study considers two asymmetrical markets and characterizes market demand in the presence of parallel imported goods based on consumer utility. It proposes the use of manufacturer’s promotion efforts to address parallel import issues and considers spillover effects of promotion efforts in a cross-market market structure, thereby improving the study of promotion efforts. The model constructed and the managerial insights derived in this study have practical implications for relevant companies. However, there are certain limitations to this study. The paper considers a supply chain model where a manufacturer sells products in two markets. In practice, the manufacturer may collaborate with retailers to sell products in overseas markets. Future research can consider a two-tier supply chain model involving manufacturers and retailers. Additionally, this study assumes that all products in different markets have the same quality level. However, in reality, the quality of products sold in different regions may vary.

Key words: parallel import, promotion efforts, spillover effect, Stackelberg game model

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