关键词: 土地流转, 土地托管, 生产托管, 生产决策, 利益联结机制

Abstract: Land-scale operation and service-scale operation, the two forms of agricultural development in China, are important ways to achieve modern Chinese agriculture. Based on the latest practices across China, this article selects a land-scale operation model with land circulation as the core and a service-scale operation model represented by land trusteeship and production trusteeship, to study the production decision-making and benefit linkage mechanism of supply chain members, and analyze the impact of parameters such as effort cost and productivity on the three agricultural operation models of land circulation, land trusteeship and production trusteeship. In particular, we answer the three research questions. First, under different agricultural scale operation models, how do members of the supply chain make production decisions? Second, how to build a benefit linkage mechanism between farmers and agricultural service enterprises to ensure the income of farmers? Third, how will the production cost reduction and productivity improvement effect brought by the scale operations affect the choices of farmers and agricultural enterprises for different scale operation models?
We start by analyzing the decentralized decision of the supply chain. Then, we build multi-stage game models to derive the equilibrium decisions of the supply chain members under different scale-operation models and compare the performances of the supply chain under different scale operation models. The contributions of this article are as follows: (1)We take small farmers in the context of modern agriculture as the research subject, systematically studying the production decisions of supply chain members under different agricultural scalemanagement models. (2)We study the benefit linkage mechanism between farmers and agricultural service enterprises under different agricultural scale operation models, in order to ensure the income of farmers. (3)We compare and analyze the impact of production costs and productivity on three agricultural scale operation models. In particular, we have obtained the following results.
(1)When productivity is relatively lower, the production trusteeship model is superior to the land circulation and land trusteeship models. Lower fixed cost of outsourcing production helps promote the active development of production trusteeship service. Higher fixed cost of outsourcing production erodes farmers’ interests, which will affect the implementation of production trusteeship service. Therefore, when promoting agricultural production trusteeship models, it is necessary to strengthen the role of village collectives as organizers. Village collectives promote the concentration of cultivated land by integrating the scattered land of farmers, which helps to increase the service scale of enterprises. Under the organization of village collectives, farmers increase their bargaining power with the enterprise, which helps to reduce the fixed cost of outsourcing production.
(2)When the agricultural service enterprise applies advanced technology to agricultural production with a high positive technological spillover effect, the land circulation model will be the optimal choice. Higher land rent improves farmers’ income but compresses the profit of leading enterprises and increases their operating difficulties. Therefore, when promoting the land circulation model, it is necessary to strengthen the coordinating role of village collectives. Village collectives effectively reduce information asymmetry in land rent by collecting supply and demand information from both sides of the land circulation market.
(3)When farmers value their land and are not willing to transfer their land, agricultural land trusteeship can meet farmers’ demands for retaining the management right, and balance the interests of the service enterprise and farmers through a revenue-sharing mechanism. When the service enterprise applies advanced technology to agricultural production with a low positive technological spillover effect, the agricultural enterprise will face operating pressure, and the probability of land abandonment will be higher. So the government’s financial subsidies for land trusteeship services are necessary.
The research conclusions of this article provide decision-making reference for promoting the collaboration between smallholder farmers and agricultural service enterprises. In the future, it is possible to further consider the impact of government subsidies on different agricultural scale operations and the risk preferences of supply chain members.

Key words: land circulation, land trusteeship, production trusteeship, production decisions, benefit linkage mechanism