关键词: 政府监查, 进化稳定策略, 企业治污

Abstract: An evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise in environmental management is established. Based on the evolutionary game model, the evolutionary process of participants’ decision is discussed, the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed, and the related influencing factors are also considered. The results show that the strategy of participants will not be affected by the weight coefficient of environmental index in achievement assessment system and the discharge capacity of enterprise. The behavioral characteristics of local government supervision and enterprise pollution control are affected by 7 factors which include initial status of game system. Although the enterprise pollution control can be promoted by reducing the cost of Both control and strengthening the punishment on enterprise, which is harmful to local government supervision. Both the enterprise pollution control and local government supervision will be promoted by enhancing the reward for local government who supervises strictly, strengthening the punishment on local government who supervises loosely, reducing the cost of supervision, and reducing the influence coefficient of enterprise profit on the payoff of local government.

Key words: government supervision, evolutionarily stable strategy, enterprise pollution control