CEO权力影响公司股价特质波动吗？——基于公司治理和风险承担双重视角

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0184

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (7): 156-164.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0184

CEO权力影响公司股价特质波动吗？——基于公司治理和风险承担双重视角

陈晓辉¹, 杨水利¹, 叶建华²

1.西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安 710054;
2.河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州 450046

收稿日期:2018-11-14 出版日期:2020-07-25
作者简介:陈晓辉(1986-),女,河南沁阳人,博士研究生,研究方向为公司治理;杨水利(1963-),男,陕西礼泉人,教授、博士生导师,研究方向为公司治理;叶建华(1983-),男,河南确山人,博士、副教授、硕士生导师,研究方向为资产定价与行为金融。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重大项目(17ZDA087)

Does CEO Power Influence the Idiosyncratic Risk? ——Based on the Dual Perspective of Corporate Governance and Risk Taking

CHEN Xiao-hui¹, YANG Shui-li¹, YE jian-hua²

1. School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054, China;
2. School of Accounting,Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046, China

Received:2018-11-14 Online:2020-07-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 影响股价特质波动的因素是当前的热点研究问题。本文认为CEO权力通过降低公司风险承担水平、弱化公司治理机制有效性两条途径降低股价特质波动。为验证该基本假设,本文以2011~2017年中国A 股上市公司为样本进行实证检验,发现在控制相关影响因素后,CEO权力对股价特质波动呈现出显著的负向影响,在非国有上市公司和小型企业中,这种关系更加显著。本研究丰富了有关CEO权力经济后果及股价特质波动影响因素的研究,对CEO权力的合理配置和公司风险管理均具有一定启示。

关键词: CEO权力, 董事会成员身份, 股价特质波动

Abstract: At present, the factors affecting heterogeneity volatility of stock price are the hot research issues. This paper argues that CEO power may reduce the heterogeneity volatility of stock price by reducing the level of corporate risk taking and weakening the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. In order to verify this basic hypothesis, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2017 as samples for empirical analysis. After controlling relevant influencing factors,we finds that CEO power still has a significant negative correlation with heterogeneity volatility of stock price.The relationship is even more pronounced among non-state-owned listed companies and small scale companies. This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of CEO power and thefactors influencing heterogeneity volatility of stock price, and has certain enlightenment significance for the reasonable allocation of CEO power and corporate risk management.

Key words: CEO power, board membership, heterogeneity volatility of stock price

中图分类号:

F275.5

陈晓辉, 杨水利, 叶建华. CEO权力影响公司股价特质波动吗？——基于公司治理和风险承担双重视角[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(7): 156-164.

CHEN Xiao-hui, YANG Shui-li, YE jian-hua. Does CEO Power Influence the Idiosyncratic Risk? ——Based on the Dual Perspective of Corporate Governance and Risk Taking[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(7): 156-164.

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CEO权力影响公司股价特质波动吗？——基于公司治理和风险承担双重视角

Does CEO Power Influence the Idiosyncratic Risk? ——Based on the Dual Perspective of Corporate Governance and Risk Taking

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