Abstract: In order to study the evolutionary law of small and medium sized private enterprises' credit behaviors, this paper applies the theory of evolutionary economics to build their credit behaviors evolutionary game model and shows the evolutionary direction by computer simulation. The study finds that if the small and medium sized private enterprises pursue short-term interests, or they are lack of fair punishment by the third-party organization, and just suffer small-loss of assets after dishonesty, then the credit behaviors of small and medium sized private enterprises will evolve into the bad “lock-in” condition.

Key words: small and medium sized private enterprises, evolutionary game, simulation

摘要： 运用演化经济学理论,通过建立中小私营企业信用行为演化博弈模型,研究中小私营企业信用行为演化规律,并用计算机仿真技术展示信用行为的演化方向。研究发现:如果中小私营企业追求短期利益、缺乏第三方公正的惩罚及失信后资产损失小,会造成中小私营企业信用行为演化成不良“锁定”状态。

关键词: 中小私营企业, 演化博弈, 仿真