[1] Hambrick D C, Mason P A. Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top managers[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1984, 9(2): 193-206. [2] Marquis C, Tilcsik A. Imprinting: toward a multilevel theory[J]. The Academy of Management Annals, 2013, 7(1): 195-245. [3] Cullinan C P, Roush P B. Has the likelihood of appointing a CEO with an accounting/finance background changed in the post sarbanes oxley era?[J]. Research in Accounting Regulation, 2011, 23(1): 71-77. [4] Custódio C, Metzger D. Financial expert CEOs: CEO's work experience and firm's financial policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, 114(1): 125-154. [5] Güner A B, Malmendier U, Tate G. Financial expertise of directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 88(2): 323-354. [6] 范龙振,张处.中国债券市场债券风险溢酬的宏观因素影响分析[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(6):116-124. [7] Chen C J P, Li Z, Su X, Sun Z. Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(2): 229-243. [8] 余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8):9-21. [9] 于蔚,汪淼军,金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012(9):125-139. [10] 吴育辉,翟玲玲,陈偲.股价崩盘风险与公司债融资——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].财务研究,2018(3):20-31. [11] 周宏,李国平,林晚发,王园.企业债券信用风险定价模型评析与进展[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(8):20-30. [12] 艾春荣,张奕,崔长峰.债券流动性与违约风险相关性溢价及实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(5):87-94. [13] Li X, Yang B, Su Y. Downside risk and defaultable bond returns[J]. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 2021, 6(1): 99-110. [14] Fisman R, Svensson J. Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? firm level evidence[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 83(1): 63-75. [15] 王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017. [16] Altman E I. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1968, 23(4): 589-609. [17] 叶志锋,胡玉明.盈余管理、债权保护与债务违约率——来自中国证券市场的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2009(11):67-73. [18] 李延喜,陈克兢.终极控制人、外部治理环境与盈余管理——基于系统广义矩估计的动态面板数据分析[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(9):56-71. |