Abstract: Based on information disclosure theory and corporate governance theory, this paper empirically tests the influence of information disclosure quality on corporate risk-taking. The empirical results show that higher information disclosure quality is helpful to improve the level of corporate risk-taking, thus verifying the “governance effect” of information disclosure. Further study finds that managerial shareholding incentive can affect information disclosure of listed companies and improve the level of corporate risk-taking, indicating that managerial shareholding can strengthen the positive relationship between information disclosure quality and corporate risk-taking, and this influential effect is more significant in the high managerial shareholding group. This conclusion not only enriches and expands the research on information disclosure and corporate risk-taking, but also has important enlightenment and practical significance to the design of incentive contracts for managers and corporate risk perception.

Key words: information disclosure quality, corporate risk-taking, governance effect, reputation effect, managerial shareholding incentive

摘要： 基于信息披露理论和公司治理理论,本文实证检验了信息披露质量对公司风险承担的影响。实证结果发现:较高的信息披露质量有助于提高公司风险承担水平,从而验证了信息披露的“治理效应”。进一步发现,管理层持股激励能够影响上市公司的信息披露行为,并提高公司风险承担水平,说明管理层持股能够加强信息披露质量与公司风险承担之间的正向关系,且这种影响关系在高管理层持股组中更显著。研究结论不仅丰富和拓展了信息披露和公司风险承担的相关研究,而且对管理层激励契约的设计和公司风险认知具有重要的启示作用和现实意义。

关键词: 信息披露质量, 公司风险承担, 治理效应, 声誉效应, 管理层持股激励