Abstract: By constructing the asymmetric game model of government and enterprise, the interaction strategies of the two parties in the supervision process of XBRL technology adoption are studied, and the evolution equilibrium strategy of the model with different parameter changes is demonstrated by MATLAB simulation. The results show that the cost and benefit of XBRL technology, government supervision, punishment,and subsidy coefficient are the key factors affecting both sides of the game. By reducing technical costs, increasing penalties and supervision, and increasing subsidies to enterprises, it will help increase the incentive for companies to adopt XBRL. Finally, from the aspects of reducing the cost of technology, implementing the staged supervision strategy in different periods and promoting the coordinated development of multi-agents, the management suggestions for promoting the adoption of XBRL technology are proposed.

Key words: XBRL technology, evolutionary game, adopted strategy, supervision

摘要： 通过构建政府与企业的非对称博弈模型,研究了二者在XBRL技术采纳的监管过程中的互动策略,并用MATLAB仿真演示了不同参数变化中模型的演化均衡结果。结果表明XBRL技术的成本效益、政府的监管力度、惩罚力度和补贴系数是影响双方博弈系统的关键因素。通过降低技术成本,提高惩罚力度和监管力度,增加对企业的补贴力度,有助于提高企业采纳XBRL的积极性。最后,从降低技术成本、实施不同时期的阶段性监管策略以及变革强制采纳的推广模式,促进多主体协调发展等方面提出推动XBRL技术采纳的管理建议。

关键词: XBRL, 演化博弈, 采纳策略, 监管