Abstract: The funding arrangements for responding to earthquake risks in China can be divided into pre-disaster preventive nature and post-disaster payout nature according to ex-ante and ex-post. How should the government allocate disaster relief funds under a certain unanticipated budget? What are the implications for earthquake insurance market equilibrium? This paper constructs a three-way evolutionary game model and finds that moderate post-disaster relief by the government can ensure both efficiency and equity, while excessive post-disaster relief will raise residents' disaster relief expectations in the long run and inhibit the formation and improvement of the commercial earthquake insurance market. Meanwhile, guiding and improving social risk management awareness and risk perception are also key to improving the efficiency of earthquake insurance market.

Key words: earthquake insurance, evolutionary game, government intervention, charity hazard

摘要： 我国应对地震风险的资金安排可以按事前与事后划分为灾前预防性质和灾后给付性质。在非预期预算一定的情况下,政府应如何分配救灾基金？对地震保险市场均衡影响如何？本文构建了一个三方演化博弈模型,分析发现政府适度的灾后救济能够同时保证效率与公平,而过度的灾后救济会在长期提高居民的救灾预期,抑制商业地震保险市场的形成与完善。同时,引导与改善社会风险管理意识和风险感知也是提高地震保险市场效率的关键。

关键词: 地震保险, 演化博弈, 政府干预, 慈善风险