Abstract: Index insurance, which combines immunity of moral hazard and adverse selection and immediate compensation, has become an important tool for catastrophe risk management. However, the rules of its market equilibrium is still unclear. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-part evolutionary game model of insurance companies, policyholders, and government. Considering the different attitudes of the policyholders in the face of loss and return, the heterogeneous risk preference is included to design the policyholder's decision function. Then, this paper analyzes the evolution path of the index insurance market equilibrium and its influencing factors. The results show that the equilibrium of the index insurance market changes along with its life cycle. The function of government in the index insurance market will move from the manager to the exit, but the subsidy needs to be within a reasonable range, and the government will subsidize the insurance company more effectively. In terms of influencing factors, the policyholders' heterogeneous risk preference has an important impact on the equilibrium evolution of the index insurance market. The sensitivity of loss will accelerate the convergence of the index insurance market to equilibrium; the immediate compensation advantage has the same effect. The spillover effect on non-participating entities delays the achievement of equilibrium. Based on the conclusion, this paper proposes some recommendations for the guidance and encouragement of the index insurance market.

Key words: index insurance market equilibrium, evolutionary game, heterogeneous risk preferences

摘要： 兼具道德风险与逆向选择免疫性和即刻赔付双重优势的指数保险逐渐成为巨灾风险管理的重要工具,但目前多处于试点阶段,市场均衡演化规律仍不明确。本文构建了指数保险市场中保险公司、投保人和政府的三方演化博弈模型,同时,考虑投保人面对损失与收益的不同风险态度,引入异质性风险偏好设计了投保人决策函数,进而分析指数保险市场均衡演化路径及其影响因素。结果表明,指数保险市场均衡随其生命周期的演进而变化,政府在指数保险市场中的职能将从管理者走向退出;政府对保险公司进行补贴更有效,但补贴力度需在适度范围内。影响因素方面,投保人的异质性风险偏好对市场均衡演化有重要影响,其损失敏感性将加快市场向均衡状态的收敛速度;提前赔付优势能够促进市场向均衡状态收敛,但溢出效应会延缓均衡的达成。基于此提出了政府对指数保险市场引导与鼓励的建议。

关键词: 指数保险市场均衡, 演化博弈, 异质性风险偏好