Abstract: With the accelerated evolution of the new technological revolution characterized by “green and intelligent”, the integration of green manufacturing and intelligent manufacturing has become the key to China’s high-quality economic development. The key to the integration of green manufacturing and intelligent manufacturing lies in the continuous innovation and promotion of major common technologies in green intelligence. Innovation in green intelligent manufacturing technology requires a sound and complete ecosystem, and the establishment of a green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem that relies on “government guidance, industry entities, university promotion”, exploring the dynamic evolution laws of the three parties in maintaining the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem has become a necessary entry point for promoting the integration of green and intelligent manufacturing.
This paper uses a stochastic evolutionary game model to analyze the evolution law between government-industry-university in the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem, providing effective decision-making support for adaptive ecosystem management in uncertain environments. The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, this paper studies the evolution mechanism of the government-industry-university collaboration in the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem, making contributions to the synergetics theory, and helping to solve the barriers to collaborative innovation between subjects. Secondly, this paper discusses the impact of market mechanism and government regulation on the collaborative R&D of green intelligent technology, which helps the Chinese government to use policy and regulatory tools scientifically to remedy market failure, and truly realize the coordination between the government and the market to maintain the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem. Thirdly, this paper introduces Gaussian white noise to construct a stochastic evolutionary game model, and analyzes the stability conditions of government-industry-university behavior strategy under the interference of random factors.
The research results indicate that in the market mechanism, a high default amount and the allocation ratio of innovation benefits and R&D costs are key factors affecting the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem. At the critical value of default amount, industry-university’s behavior strategy is highly susceptible to random factors. At this point, industry-university’s innovation benefits and R&D cost allocation ratio have a significant impact on industry-university’s behavior strategy, and industry-university’s innovation benefits and R&D costs have the best allocation ratio. Under the regulation of government participation, the government’s reward and punishment intensity is positively related to the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem, and the reward and punishment mechanism plays a more significant role in the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem than a single mechanism, which can not only save the government’s financial expenditure, but also achieve the desired effect. At the same time, government regulation can effectively avoid industry-university opportunism behavior, enable industry-university to maintain long-term effective collaborative research and development of green intelligent technologies.
To better maintain the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem, this paper proposes the following suggestions. Firstly, improve the liability system for breach of contract. Industry-university signed a cooperation agreement in the collaborative research and development of green intelligent technology, specifying the liability for breach of contract and the amount of compensation for breach of contract, eliminating speculators’ speculative behavior, and thus maintaining the stability of the green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem. Secondly, develop a reasonable profit and cost allocation plan. Develop a reasonable mechanism for profit distribution and cost sharing, so that the industry-university profit distribution and cost sharing ratio reach the optimal value for both parties, thereby enhancing the enthusiasm of industry-university in collaborative research and development of green intelligent technology. Thirdly, fully leverage the government’s guiding role. According to the fact that industry primarily focus on economic interests and academic research primarily focuses on social interests, the government should increase its policy orientation towards academic research, increase its willingness to participate, and then attract a wide range of industry to participate through academic research.

Key words: green intelligent manufacturing ecosystem, random evolutionary game, government-industry-university collaboration

摘要： 本文通过构建随机演化博弈模型,剖析绿色智能制造生态系统中政产学研间博弈的动态演化规律,并通过仿真分析影响绿色智能制造生态系统稳定性的关键因素。研究表明:在市场机制下,违约金额临界值处,绿色智能制造生态系统中产学研行为策略极易受到随机因素干扰,产学研的创新收益和研发成本分摊比例对产学研的行为策略影响呈倒“U”型;在政府规制下,政府的奖惩力度与绿色智能制造生态系统的稳定程度呈正相关,而奖惩机制同时作用较单一补贴、惩罚机制对绿色智能制造生态系统的稳定成效更为显著。因此,政府应完善监管机制,增强企业绿色智能技术创新主体地位,鼓励引导学研积极参与协同创新,形成政府-企业-学研合力,共同维持绿色智能制造生态系统的稳定。

关键词: 绿色智能制造生态系统, 随机演化博弈, 政产学研协同