Abstract: A decrease in commercial land has brought some problems to enterprises, such as increasing inventory costs and slow supply. In order to alleviate the above problems, more and more companies are registering in developed areas or urban areas, while establishing off-site inventory in underdeveloped areas or non-urban areas. However, to some extent, the logistics industry transfer has led to the problem of imbalanced tax benefits between governments of two regions. Thus, in order to ensure the effective transfer or evacuation of logistics functions in enterprises, it is urgent to establish an effective incentive mechanism for horizontal intergovernmental cooperation.
To achieve the balance of interests between horizontal governments, we can adopt such restraint mechanisms as revenue sharing, risk sharing, and punishment to achieve a win-win cooperation. Based on the perspective of bounded rationality, we introduce the proportion of revenue sharing, establishes an evolutionary game model between developed and underdeveloped regional governments, and simulate the evolution process of horizontal intergovernmental cooperation strategies. Under the three mechanisms (no constraint, central government coordination and horizontal government self-restraint), we respectively analyze cooperation evolution strategies and profit sharing ratio between horizontal governments, study the promotion effect of different constraint mechanisms on horizontal intergovernmental cooperation, so as to promote horizontal intergovernmental cooperation and provide a certain decision support.
The research shows that two governments cannot obtain evolutionarily stable strategy without constraints. Under the constraints of the central government, the tax sharing ratio cannot be too high, otherwise local governments cannot cooperate. Compared with the government's self-regulation, the regulation scope of profit sharing proportion restriction under the constraints of the central government is high, and the regulation efficiency is low. The central government should strengthen its own policy confidence, increase supervision, punishment levels, and administrative intervention in local governments that do not share or improve. At the same time, the central government should also establish corresponding supervision systems, and eliminate the phenomenon of “free riding” among local governments. At last, the central government should establish a good constraint and incentive mechanism to scientifically guide the interest game between local governments.
Furthermore, we obtain some management implications: for local governments that cooperate for the first time, the central government should strengthen guidance, leverage the vertical political and administrative advantages between the central and local governments, and achieve coordinated regional development. For local governments with a foundation in cooperation and historical experience, it is necessary to leverage the economic advantages of horizontal cooperation between local governments, continuously explore new ways and methods of cooperation, improve cooperation efficiency, and coordinate the interests of local governments within the region to form an institutionalized multi-level cooperation organizational system. For governments that do not adopt profit sharing and local governments that do not improve logistics service levels, the punishment can be appropriately increased to encourage them to actively share and improve regional logistics service levels.

Key words: evolution game, logistics, service level, intergovernmental cooperation

摘要： 面对日益减少的商业用地,为缓解企业因此而带来的库存成本增多、供货缓慢等问题,横向府际间的异地库存和收益共享是双方发展、共赢的必经之路。考虑政府所在地的物流服务水平,建立物流产业转移背景下横向府际间的演化博弈模型,在一定的惩罚机制下分别研究无政府约束、中央政府约束和横向政府自我约束三种情形下的演化稳定条件。研究表明:在无约束下,无法实现双方政府的合作;在中央政府约束和自我约束下,可以实现双方政府的合作,但是对于政府之间的收入分享比例有一定的要求,中央政府相比横向政府自我约束,收入分享比例约束的调节范围更高,而调节的效率较低。

关键词: 演化博弈, 物流, 服务水平, 府际间合作