Abstract: Judicial mediation in China has undergone three developmental stages, evolving from an initial focus on mediation to a later emphasis on adjudication, and now, in response to a sharp increase in pending cases and the frequent escalation of social conflicts, China has adopted a “combination of mediation and adjudication.” The positive value of judicial mediation in “reducing disharmony and promoting social harmony” is particularly prominent at present. At its core, the institutional value of judicial mediation lies in achieving a Pareto improvement in social welfare through innovative models of interest distribution. Its core value is to transcend the zero-sum game of litigation and establish a positive-sum game framework to promote social harmony. However, the current judicial mediation model in China still exhibits strong rigid characteristics, meaning that it resolves disputes strictly in accordance with the law, thereby excluding the possibility of seeking appropriate solutions from a holistic perspective of the dispute. This is inconsistent with the aforementioned institutional value. To address this dilemma, this paper identifies the characteristics of cases suitable for judicial mediation and explores how to construct a corresponding judicial mediation model to enable parties to achieve a positive-sum game and increase factors contributing to social harmony.
This paper is based on Lindblom’s three-element theory of authority, exchange, and persuasion, combined with nonlinear programming to construct a value creation model. Specifically, it quantifies the distribution status of property resources (divisible/indivisible assets) and non-property benefits (apology level, visit frequency, etc.), and under the constraints of total resource quantity and pre-set acceptance thresholds, establishes a total benefit maximization objective function through optimization algorithms. A simplified Shapley value algorithm is employed to calculate the cooperation surplus by comparing the net benefit difference between cooperative alliances and non-cooperative states, and allocate value-added based on marginal contribution weights.
The article analyzes successful mediation cases involving statutory inheritance and defamation disputes from the Peking University Law Database, extracting two dimensions of value creation. Based on the analysis of successful mediation cases, by deconstructing the dual dimensions of property income appreciation and non-property income optimization, the paper proposes three criteria for case selection: cases must possess dual-dimensional interest appreciation potential, feature a composite interest appreciation exchange structure, and meet the equilibrium conditions of dynamic game theory. This identifies four common types of cases suitable for mediation: family relationship restoration cases, property rights restructuring cases, cooperative surplus development cases, and social capital regeneration cases. Using cases involving statutory inheritance and support disputes as examples, the study demonstrates the implementation process of judicial mediation based on quantifying value-added distribution using a nonlinear programming model. The research indicates that such a judicial mediation can achieve a dual optimization of legal outcomes and social governance efficiency, providing theoretical support and operational pathways for the paradigm shift of judicial mediation from “resolving disputes” to “creating value.”
Future research could further explore quantification methods for non-property gains, such as developing assessment tools based on dimensions like emotional accounts and reputational capital, combined with intelligent technologies like natural language processing and big data analysis to extract non-material gain indicators. Additionally, interdisciplinary collaboration should be deepened, incorporating assessment methods from psychology and sociology to establish a more comprehensive quantification system for non-material gains.

Key words: judicial mediation, nonlinear programming, interest distribution, property disputes

摘要： 司法调解的本质在于通过创新利益分配模式实现社会总福利的帕累托改进,其核心价值是超越诉讼的零和博弈,构建正和博弈框架以促进社会和谐。本文以非线性规划理论为分析工具,结合权威、交换、说服三要素理论,构建司法调解的“价值创造”模型,为司法调解建立一种定量分析的理论基础,即:通过价值创造的基本思想,有效的完成从零和博弈到非零和合作博弈的过渡。基于对调解成功案例的分析,通过解构财产收益增值与非财产收益优化双重维度,提出案件筛选的三大标准,识别出常见的四类可调解案件类型。并以法定继承及赡养纠纷案件为例,展示以非线性规划模型量化价值增值分配为基础的司法调解过程。

关键词: 司法调解, 非线性规划, 利益分配, 财产纠纷