Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Transfer in Industry Alliance Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0062

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (3): 92-99.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0062

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Transfer in Industry Alliance Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

WU Jie¹, WU Xiao-ju¹, LI Peng¹, SHENG Yong-xiang¹, SHI Qin-fen²

1.Economics & Management School, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China;
2.Division of Science & Technology, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, China

Received:2015-12-09 Online:2017-03-25

基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析

吴洁¹, 吴小桔¹, 李鹏¹, 盛永祥¹, 施琴芬²

1.江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江 212003;
2.苏州科技大学科研产业部,江苏苏州 215009

作者简介:吴洁(1968-),女,江苏滨海人,江苏科技大学教授,博士,研究方向:知识管理,技术创新。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重点项目“产业技术创新联盟企业动态能力提升的创新机制与实现路径研究”的研究(14AGL001);国家自然科学基金项目“‘政产学研金’协同创新下知识流动力学模型及制度设计”(71271119);国家自然科学基金“跨界隐性知识的协同效应对颠覆式创新绩效的影响研究”(71471091)

Abstract

Abstract: The process of knowledge transfer is a complicated course of playing chess. Evolutionary game theory is a good way to explain behaviors of knowledge transfer actor. Considering that the evolutionary game has limitation in explaining the irrational factors and risk preference of knowledge transfer actor, prospect theory is integrated into evolutionary game theory in this study. A prospect value function is used to improve partial parameter in payoff?matrix to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy. The result shows that there are two evolutionary stable strategies in knowledge transfer process. Transfer policy is determined by the direct incomes, the cost of knowledgetransfer, prospect profit and loss. Risk losses have larger influence on transfer policy for suppliers, while potential earnings have less influence on transfer policy for recipients.

Key words: industry alliance, knowledge transfer, evolutionary game, cumulative prospect theory

摘要： 知识转移过程是一个复杂的博弈过程,演化博弈论可以很好地解释转移主体行为。考虑到传统的演化博弈模型不能对知识转移主体非理性心理因素及风险偏好问题进行有效解释,本文将累积前景理论与演化博弈相结合,运用前景价值函数完善支付矩阵的部分参数,分析博弈模型的演化稳定策略。通过仿真模拟得出如下结论:知识转移存在两个演化稳定策略;转移策略由直接收益、转移成本及前景损益等因素决定;转移方的风险损失对转移策略影响较大,而接收方潜在收入对知识转移策略影响较小。

关键词: 产业联盟, 知识转移, 演化博弈, 累积前景理论

CLC Number:

G302

WU Jie, WU Xiao-ju, LI Peng, SHENG Yong-xiang, SHI Qin-fen. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Transfer in Industry Alliance Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(3): 92-99.

吴洁, 吴小桔, 李鹏, 盛永祥, 施琴芬. 基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(3): 92-99.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Transfer in Industry Alliance Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析

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