Abstract: On the condition that the value of the constraint of carbon emission cannot be determined by government individually, a stackelberg model is used to analyze government’s and a company’s behaviors of choosing green technologies when they are facing different constraints of carbon emission in the decentralized system. For the government or regulator, the paper introduces social welfare as the objective and social attention to environment is also added to this model, and furthermore, this paper analyzes the influence of these factors when regulator’s decisions are considered. And for the company, the results indicate that the firm’s reaction to an increase in the value of constrain may be non-monotone. And we also study the relationship between technology choosing and cost of technology, and we find that two key factors determine whether the cleanest technology is inducible as compared with another technology: one factor is the fixed cost caused by using corresponding technology every producing cycle and another factor is whether the economic benefits generated by the green technology is sufficient to offset operating cost at some feasible value of constraint. Finally, this paper discusses whether government or regulator can make cleaner green technology inducible to the firm by the proper value of emission limitation and some suggestionsto the government or regulator and firm are given.

摘要： 在碳排放约束额不能由政府单独决定的条件下,本文通过Stackelberg博弈模型分析了非集中决策系统中政府与企业对绿色技术的决策行为。对政府而言,在考虑以社会福利为目标的基础上引入了社会对环境的关注度,并分析了该因素对政府决策的影响。对企业而言,分析结果表明企业对绿色技术的选择并不随着约束值单调变化。当考虑技术成本对博弈双方决策的影响,发现企业对绿色技术的选择是由技术成本和产品经济效益对成本的补偿程度决定的。最后,综合考虑博弈双方的决策,本文讨论了政府能否通过适当的约束值来促使企业选择更好的绿色技术,并给出了建议。

关键词: 绿色技术, 碳排放约束, Stackelberg game