Abstract: An evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise in environmental management is established. Based on the evolutionary game model, the evolutionary process of participants’ decision is discussed, the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed, and the related influencing factors are also considered. The results show that the strategy of participants will not be affected by the weight coefficient of environmental index in achievement assessment system and the discharge capacity of enterprise. The behavioral characteristics of local government supervision and enterprise pollution control are affected by 7 factors which include initial status of game system. Although the enterprise pollution control can be promoted by reducing the cost of Both control and strengthening the punishment on enterprise, which is harmful to local government supervision. Both the enterprise pollution control and local government supervision will be promoted by enhancing the reward for local government who supervises strictly, strengthening the punishment on local government who supervises loosely, reducing the cost of supervision, and reducing the influence coefficient of enterprise profit on the payoff of local government.

Key words: government supervision, evolutionarily stable strategy, enterprise pollution control

摘要： 通过建立环境治理中地方政府与排污企业的进化博弈模型,考察了参与者的决策演化过程,分析了参与者的进化稳定策略及其影响因素。研究表明,地方政府政绩考核体系中环境指标的权重系数、企业的排污量并不会影响博弈双方的策略选择。地方政府监查行为和企业治污行为会受到包括系统初始状态在内的7种因素的影响。加大对企业不完全治污的处罚,降低企业的治污成本,尽管可以促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化,但却会不利于地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化;而中央政府提高对地方政府严格监查的奖励,加大对地方政府监查不力的处罚,降低地方政府的监查成本,以及降低企业利润对地方政府支付水平的影响系数,既可以促使地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化,又能够促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化。

关键词: 政府监查, 进化稳定策略, 企业治污