Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2018, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (6): 14-20.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2018.0129

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Laws Used by Collaborative Innovation Subjects and the Simulation of Government Intervention

LI Lin, YUAN Ye, LIU Hong   

  1. Business School, Hunan University, Hunan 410082, China
  • Received:2016-07-01 Online:2018-06-25

协同创新主体合作的演化博弈及政府干预的仿真

李林, 袁也, 刘红   

  1. 湖南大学 工商管理学院,湖南 长沙 410082
  • 作者简介:李林(1963-),男,湖南长沙,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:项目管理;袁也(1990-),女,湖南长沙,硕士研究生,研究方向:项目管理;刘红(1985-),女,湖北荆州,博士研究生,研究方向:项目管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71473076):协同创新项目利益多层次多阶段动态均衡及促进政策研究

Abstract: By using the evolutionary game theory, this paper first studies the evolutionary game laws which are commonly used by collaborative innovation subjects under the non-government intervention. When there exists government intervention, the evolutionary game laws are then studied based on the theory of system dynamics and a corresponding system dynamics model is constructed. Finally, simulations are presented by applying Vensim. The results show that cooperation between collaborative innovation subjects is mainly influenced by the degree of punishment from government, punishment mechanism and the production cost of innovation subjects in speculation. Therefore, by increasing penalties and using dynamic punishment mechanisms, government can impel the innovation subjects to adopt cooperation strategies so as to achieve collaborative innovation.

Key words: collaborative innovation subject, collaborative innovation projects, evolutionary game, system dynamics(SD)

摘要: 文章首先基于演化博弈理论,研究了无政府干预下协同创新主体采取合作策略的演化博弈规律;其次基于系统动力学理论,分析了政府干预下协同创新主体采取合作策略的演化博弈规律,并构建了系统动力学模型及运用Vensim软件作出了仿真分析。仿真发现,协同创新主体间的合作主要受政府惩罚力度、采取的惩罚机制以及创新主体采取投机行为所产生的生产成本的影响。因此,政府提高惩罚力度并采用动态惩罚机制,能促使协同创新主体更快地采取合作策略进行协同创新。

关键词: 协同创新主体, 协同创新项目, 演化博弈, 系统动力学(SD)

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