Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders in the NIMBY Conflicts ——A Case Study of Pollution NIMBY Facility

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0063

Abstract

Abstract: In the process of industrialization and urbanization, while promoting the development of social economy, it also gave birth to the awakening of citizen's right consciousness and environmental protection consciousness.Under the macro background of the overall interests and local interests, economic interests and environmental interests,pollution NIMBY facility has become an important incentive to lead to the NIMBY conflicts after labor disputes, illegal land acquisition.Therefore, it is important to explore the relationship between the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident, and to sort out the interests of the main body, which is of great significance in the prevention and treatment of the NIMBY conflicts.Based on the theory of stakeholders, this paper explores the role and function of the stakeholders in the conflict, so as to construct the three-party evolution game model of the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident from the perspective of evolutionary game theory.On this basis, through the analysis of the stable evolution game strategy of the government, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise and the surrounding resident, this paper concludes the conditions for the convergence of the three-party main body to the evolutionary stable strategy. This paper also uses Matlab to simulate the evolution model of the three-party, and finds thatthe government adopts the strategy of non-supervision, the NIMBY facility construction enterprise to adopt the strategy of cooperation and the surrounding resident to take the non-resistance strategy isthe stable strategy point of the evolution game of the three party interest main body in the NIMBY conflicts;high intensity of government incentives is conducive for the promotion of construction enterprises to adopt a cooperative strategy, and restrain the surrounding resident to choose the choice of resistance behavior strategy; the construction enterprises economic compensation has a critical point to reduce the resistance of the resident, only the high economic compensation will encourage people to choose the behavior strategy without resistance;and the resistance of the surrounding resident has no significant influence on the strategic choice of NIMBY facility construction companies.The results of this paper has a certain enlightenment for the stakeholders of NIMBY conflict: first, as NIMBY facilities’ regulator, government should grasping the extent of supervision, perfect the public participation channels, and reduce individual risk perception; second, as the executor of the NIMBY facilities, construction enterprises should actively use the environmental technologies, construct the scientific interest compensation mechanism; third, the surrounding people play a key role for the NIMBY “landing”, they should strengthen their own public rational, reasonable assessment of NIMBY risk, maintain the social public interest.

Key words: NIMBY conflicts, pollution NIMBY Facility, evolutionary game, stakeholders, simulation analysis

摘要： 工业化、城市化进程的加快在推进社会经济发展的同时,也催生了公民权利意识和环保意识的觉醒。在整体利益与局部利益、经济利益与环境利益等一系列矛盾交织的宏观背景下,继劳资纠纷、征地拆迁之后,污染类邻避设施成为诱发群体性事件的关键因子。因此,探究政府、邻避设施营建企业与周边民众三方间利益关系,理清相关主体的利益诉求对于邻避冲突的预防和处置具有重要实践意义。本文基于利益相关者理论,探究污染类邻避设施相关利益主体在冲突中所扮演的角色和发挥的作用,进而从博弈论视角出发构建政府、邻避设施营建企业和周边民众之间的三方演化博弈模型。在此基础上,通过对政府、营建企业和周边民众的稳定演化博弈策略选择分析,得出推动博弈三方向演化稳定策略点收敛的条件。利用Matlab对三方演化模型模拟仿真,结果表明政府采取不监管策略、营建企业采取合作策略及周边民众采取不抵抗策略是邻避冲突中三方利益相关者演化博弈的稳定策略点;高强度的政府奖励力度有利于促进营建企业采取合作策略,而抑制周边民众抵抗行为策略的选择;营建企业的经济补偿对于降低民众抵抗力度具有临界点,只有高额的经济补偿才会激励民众选择不抵抗的行为策略;而周边民众的抵抗力度对营建企业的策略选择无显著影响。本文研究结果对邻避冲突中相关利益主体起到一定启示作用:第一,政府作为邻避设施建设的监管者,应注重把握监管力度,完善公众参与渠道,降低个体风险感知;第二,营建企业作为邻避设施建设的实施者,应积极采用环保技术,构建科学利益补偿机制;第三,周边民众对于邻避设施的“落地”发挥关键作用,应加强自身公共理性,合理评估邻避风险,自觉维护社会公共利益。

关键词: 邻避冲突, 污染类邻避设施, 演化博弈, 利益相关者, 仿真分析

CLC Number:

C931

KANG Wei, DU Lei. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders in the NIMBY Conflicts ——A Case Study of Pollution NIMBY Facility[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(3): 82-92.

康伟, 杜蕾. 邻避冲突中的利益相关者演化博弈分析——以污染类邻避设施为例[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(3): 82-92.

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