Abstract: In order to gain advantages in competition, enterprises should select a rational environmental innovation mode under environmental regulation. Based on the assumption that enterprises’ products are substitutable and there exist differences between different environmental innovation modes, an evolutionary game model is established which explains the effects of governmental environmental innovation investment subsidies and carbon tax on the selection of enterprises’ environmental innovation mode. Besides, a theoretical and numerical simulation analysis is carried on concerning the evolution path, stable equilibrium strategy and the influence mechanism. The results show that enterprise groups will evolve to an “ideal state” of all adoption environmental breakthrough innovation mode only when they can obtain excess returns under environmental regulation. In addition, both the governmental environmental innovation investment subsidies and carbon tax can encourage enterprises in carrying out environmental innovation activities and can quicken enterprises’ evolution to the environmental breakthrough innovation mode. Moreover, carbon tax should be controlled in a certain range to maximize its incentive effect while its effect is significant.

Key words: green innovation modes selection, green innovation investment allowance, carbon tax, evolutionary game, manufacturers

摘要： 为获取竞争优势,企业会根据政府环境规制对绿色创新模式做出合理选择。以企业产品具有可替代性、不同绿色创新模式资本投入具有差异性为前提,构建了政府绿色创新投入补贴与征收碳税对制造企业绿色创新模式选择影响的演化博弈模型,并对演化路径、稳定均衡策略及影响机理进行理论与数值仿真分析。研究结果表明:当政府行为下的企业通过突破式绿色创新获得的最低额外净收益为正值时,企业群体才会向全部选择突破式绿色创新模式的“理想状态”演化;绿色创新投入补贴与征收碳税均能提升企业开展突破式绿色创新活动的可能性,并能诱导企业加速向突破式绿色创新演化;征收碳税的激励作用较为显著,应将其控制在一定范围使其发挥最大促进作用。

关键词: 绿色创新模式选择, 绿色创新投入补贴, 碳税, 演化博弈, 制造企业