Research on Project Safety Management Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0105

Abstract

Abstract: To reduce the frequency of safety accident and the losses of casualties and investors in the process of project construction, an evolutionary game model between constructor and supervisor is built to discuss the evolutionary stable strategy and influence factor in repeatedly game behavior in this paper, and an evolutionary path of the game is numerically verified with different initial conditions. The results show that the safety and stability of project are related to the strength of economic punishment, reputation loss, probability of accident, rectification fees, the constructor’s cost savings for breach of contract and the pay for the supervisor. Based on the analysis, several measures for project safety management are presented accordingly.

Key words: safety management, stable strategy, evolutionary game, engineering projects

摘要： 为降低工程项目施工过程中安全事故发生频率,减少人员伤亡和投资者损失,本文运用演化博弈构建施工方和监理方博弈模型,探讨二者策略选取的影响因素及演化均衡,分析参数变化对演化稳定策略的影响,并通过数值模拟验证不同初始值下的演化路径。结果表明:工程项目安全稳定与事故发生的经济惩罚力度、声誉损失、事故发生概率、监理督促整改费以及施工方违规节约成本和支付给监理的费用等因素相关,并提出对应措施来保障项目的安全实施。

关键词: 安全管理, 演化稳定策略, 演化博弈, 工程项目

CLC Number:

F224.32

LIAO Jia, ZHOU Qiang. Research on Project Safety Management Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(5): 71-76.

廖佳,周强. 基于演化博弈的工程项目施工安全管理分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(5): 71-76.

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