Abstract: Local governments, pollution enterprises and the public are all major participants in the haze control . It is of great significance for haze control to study the interests and influencing factors systematically between the three participants. From the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper establishes a tripartite-game model on the basis of bounded rationality, and explores the conditions of collaborative governance. The results of equilibrium point analysis and numerical simulation can be obtained: The three participants of evolutionary game have different strategies under different stable conditions. The system can get rid of the bad state, and then form a tripartite co-governance model by increasing the amount of direct sewage penalty, potential benefits of local government, potential losses of polluting enterprises,public long-term benefits and reducing the cost of public. The evolution speed of any participants will be affected by the proportion of its own strategy and the other two subject strategies. However, no matter how the proportion of the participants changes, the final game result will not be changed.These findings have reference effect for haze control.

Key words: haze control, collaboration, evolutionary game, three participants

摘要： 地方政府、污染企业和公众是雾霾治理行动的主要参与者,系统研究这三个参与主体之间的利益关系和影响因素,对于雾霾污染的改善具有重要意义。本文从演化博弈的角度出发,在有限理性的基础上,建立三方动态博弈模型,探究使各主体达成协作治理的条件。通过均衡点分析和数值仿真结果可得:三方博弈主体在不同稳定性条件下的策略选择不同,通过提高直接排污罚款金额、地方政府严格治理潜在收益、污染企业直接排污潜在损失、公众长远收益和降低公众参与成本等方式能使系统跳出不良状态,形成三方共同治理模式;任一博弈主体策略演化速度会受到自身策略选择比例及另外两主体策略选择比例的影响,但无论三方博弈主体策略选择比例如何变化,都不会改变最终博弈结果。这些研究结果对改善当前雾霾污染状况具有积极的借鉴意义。

关键词: 雾霾治理, 协作机制, 演化博弈, 三方主体