Abstract: The technology of urban garbage power generation tends to be mature, but some enterprises do not choose green technology for clean incineration of green power generation, which causes public protests. Aiming at the optimization of current fiscal strategy in guiding green power generation behavior of enterprises, a multi-dimensional evolutionary game model of government, enterprise and resident is established, and the influence of fiscal decision variables on green power generation behavior strategy of enterprises is analyzed, and propositions are put forward. There are four fiscal decision variables, including electricity price subsidy, garbage disposal fee payment, tax rebate and equipment purchase tax deduction, which can effectively guide the parameter range of green power generation behavior of enterprises. Based on the actual data, the green power generation behavior of enterprises is simulated by Matlab. The convergence and sensitivity of fiscal decision variables to the green power generation behavior strategy of enterprises are analyzed, and finally the optimization suggestions of fiscal strategy are put forward. The results show that indirect financial support may lead enterprises to take green incineration behavior, lower the threshold of electricity price subsidy, and reduce the cost of direct fiscal expenditure.

Key words: urban garbage power generation, clean incineration, financial support, evolutionary game

摘要： 城市垃圾发电技术趋于成熟,但是部分企业并没有选择绿色技术进行清洁焚烧绿色发电,引发公众抗议。针对现行财政策略对企业绿色发电行为引导的不足,建立政府-企业-居民多维演化博弈模型,分析财政决策变量对企业绿色发电行为策略的影响,提出命题并推导证明电价补贴、垃圾处理费支付、税收退税和设备采购抵税这四个财政决策变量能够有效引导企业绿色发电行为的参数值域,并基于现实数据进行Matlab仿真,分析各财政决策变量对企业绿色发电行为策略的收敛性和敏感性作用,最后提出财政策略优化建议。结果表明通过财政间接扶持方式引导企业绿色技术行为,能使电价补贴处于更低阈值,减少财政直接支出成本,不可过度依赖电价补贴,需改善垃圾处理费支付水平,丰富税收扶持手段。

关键词: 城市垃圾发电, 清洁焚烧, 财政扶持, 演化博弈