Abstract: The collaborative innovation of government, enterprisesand universities is an important measure to promote the development of new energy automobiles. China will cancel the subsidy for new energy automobiles soon, which will have a huge impact on the new energy automobile industry undoubtedly. The tripartite evolutionary game model is used to establish the evolutionary payoff matrix of the collaborative innovation among the enterprises of new energy automobiles, universities and government in the context of cancelling subsidy for new energy automobiles in this paper. The impacts of correlative parameters on collaborative innovation strategies of them are studied by Matlab numerical simulation. The results show that the increase speeds in the aspiration of participating in collaborative innovation are different for the three parties, and the aspiration of government dropsas that of new energy automobile enterprises and universities increases; the speed of stabilization of new energy automobile enterprises’ aspiration of participating in collaborative innovation is constantly higher than that of universities; the incentive cost paid by the government for the collaborative innovation with new energy automobile enterprises and universities affects the government’s aspiration of participation; whether the government participates in the obtainable income or not can’t affect the government’s aspiration of participation alone, while whether the government participates in the difference between the obtainable incomes or not could determine the aspiration of participation of the government.

Key words: new energy automobile, collaborative innovation, government, enterprises and universities, tripartite evolutionary game theory

摘要： 政产学协同创新是促进新能源汽车发展的重要举措。我国将进入新能源汽车后补贴时代,这项举措无疑会对新能源汽车产业带来巨大的影响。本文在拟取消新能源汽车补贴的大背景下,运用三方演化博弈方法,建立了新能源汽车企业、高校、政府三方的协同创新博弈支付矩阵,通过Matlab的数值仿真,研究了相关参数对三方协同创新策略的影响。结果表明:三方参与协同创新意愿增长速度不同,且政府参与意愿会随着新能源汽车企业和高校参与意愿的增长而下降;新能源汽车企业参与协同创新的意愿趋近于稳定的速度始终快于高校;政府对新能源汽车企业和高校协同创新的激励成本的大小影响着政府的参与意愿;政府参与和不参与协同创新的可获得收益不能单独影响政府的参与意愿,参与和不参与可获得收益之间差额的大小决定政府的参与意愿。

关键词: 新能源汽车, 协同创新, 政产学, 三方演化博弈