关键词: 应急物资管理, 委托代储系统, 努力程度, 激励契约设计

Abstract: The agent emergency supplies reservation under government consigning is a common strategy of emergency supplies management, and the enterprise’s effort plays an vital role in materials supply, but because the goals they pursue between government and enterprise are inconsistent, and the transparency of information is constrained by some objective conditions, enterprises are more likely to develop weariness emotion because of a long period of time in peace, or may pay less for pursuing economic benefit, so the total effort will decline, which brings potential risk to material supply in emergency. Hence, the article builds a game theory model between the enterprise and government by using supply chain contract theory, which analyzes the influence of the incentive method and incentive subsidy on the enterprise’s efforts and searches for the optimal parameter settings through numerical stimulation. Then the paper designs an incentive contract on agent emergency supplies reservation system by making the corresponding rewards and punishment rule. Above all, the incentive contract has a great effect on the government in managing the enterprise efficiently. It also can stimulate the enterprise to improve its efforts, and what’s more, the paper offers?theoretical support for promoting the emergency supplies capacity under the condition of emergencies.

Key words: emergency supplies management, agent reserve system, effort degree, incentive contract design