关键词: 双边平台竞争, 用户分配, Rubinstein讨价还价模型, 平台差异, 网络外部性

Abstract: The main body of the two-sided platform is the platform itself and the users. The existence of the platform is based on the participation of the users. So the distribution of the users is the interest of the two-sided market. In the competitive two-sided market, this paper establishes a two-stage two-sided platform competition model. The paper uses the Rubinstein bargaining model to describe the differences between the sellers and decide the quotient of sellers in the first stage. The paper is divided into the profit maximization and social welfare maximization of the two cases in the second stage. We describe the size of the buyers on the platform preferences, and seek equilibrium. Through this model, the influence of network external coefficient on platform equilibrium market share and market stakeholders’ benefit is analyzed under competitive platform. The study shows that the number of buyers is involved by the size of the network and the network externalities. The scale of the platform is not case that the bigger the better. In considering the social welfare maximization, the buyer’s participation is not affected by network externality coefficient of buyers. But the total social welfare is positively related to it.

Key words: two-sided platform competition, user assignment, rubinstein bargaining model, platform differences, network externality