关键词: 反恐设施选址, 设施改建与新建, 均衡策略, 变量设施数量

Abstract: The paper studies a location game underneath (in case of) the terrorist attack with astate and an extremist organization being two players, in which the terrorist attacks cities to maximize its utility while the state being a leader in the Stackelberg CompetitionModelforesees terrorist tactics to make location decisions for minimizing its loss.For the object of location decision, we deliberate a more realistic scenario: consideration of the existing facilities’ layout. Faced with these existing facilities, which have already been there before terrorist incident, weconductcasestudies of 20 urban areas todiscusswhen to consider the reconstruction or construction, as well as how to carry out the strategic choice. In addition, the location game is regarded as a mathematical programming problem in the condition among both fixed and variable number of facilities,and the location decision model based on existing facilities is constructed. At the same time, the state’s equilibrium utilities are discussed when the number of facilities is a variable. The consequences demonstrate that, for the government, the strategy to consider rebuilding facilities is always better than a strategy that does not consider rebuilding facilities, and considering the rebuilding strategy, there is an inherent relationship between the building numbers and rebuilding numbers when the facilities number is fixed, which poses an effect on the equilibrium strategy together with their cost parameters. The state’s strategychoice mainly depends on the ratio between the two cost parameters, and keeps constantin some threshold areas. The change rule of optimal gross facilities number exists when the number of facilities is variable. The government's equilibrium utility is not a monotonic function of K, Namely, the state can use fewer facilities than K butachieve the goal of K facilities.

Key words: a location game, facilities rebuilding and building, equilibrium utilities, variable number of facilities