关键词: 战略性新兴产业, 金融支持, 产业创新, 两阶段演化博弈

Abstract: This paper aims to solve the problem of how the financial support affects the cultivation of the innovative body in the strategic emerging industries. On the basis of analyzing the mechanism of double helix coupling among financial support agents, a two-stage evolutionary game model of the financial support in the strategic emerging industries is built. Then, the phase plane theory of the dynamic system is used to calculate the approximate analytical solution of the two-stage ESS. Finally, with the aid of MATLAB, the numerical simulation of the two-stage evolutionary game model is realized in order to analyze the influence of different parameters on the evolution of the two-stage ESS. The results show that: (1)there are opportunistic behavior and non-opportunistic behavior, which are opposite and one of them is dominant; (2)when the opportunistic behavior (or non-opportunistic behavior) is dominant, the u value of the financial support body will be smaller (or larger), and decrease (or increase) moderately, the subsidy k will be conducive to enhancing the positivity of innovative body in the strategic emerging industry to accept the subsidy; (3)the self-owned funds R of the innovative body in the strategic emerging industry has little influence on the positivity, but the more stable the subsidy funds rate is, the more beneficial it is to improve their enthusiasm. Based on these conclusions, this paper constructs a two-stage ESS evolutionary framework of the strategic emerging industries financial support, and explores its path of progressive function from “cumulative function”to“paradoxical function”and to“cumulative-paradoxical function”, so as to finish the balanced evolution of the two-stage ESS from " supporting actively” to “accepting actively”, which provides theoretical support for the government to formulate relevant policies that improve the efficiency of financial support for the cultivation of innovative subjects.

Key words: strategic emerging industries, financial support, industrial innovation, two-stage evolutionary game