创始人控制、控制链长度与真实盈余管理

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0168

运筹与管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 214-220.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0168

创始人控制、控制链长度与真实盈余管理

李秉祥, 张涛, 陶瑞

西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安 710048

收稿日期:2019-04-19 出版日期:2021-05-25
作者简介:李秉祥(1964-),男,陕西扶风人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:资本市场会计与上市公司财务;张涛(1981-),男,山东济宁人,副教授, 博士研究生,研究方向:资本市场会计与公司治理;陶瑞(1985-),女,河南信阳人,博士研究生,研究方向:上市公司财务。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772151);江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(15EYB012)

Founder Control, the Length of Control Chain and Real Earnings Management

LI Bing-xiang, ZHANG Tao, TAO Rui

School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Shanxi xi'an 710048, China

Received:2019-04-19 Online:2021-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 从控制链长度的视角出发,去探寻金字塔结构对于家族企业真实盈余管理的影响,有助于进一步丰富对于金字塔结构的认识,具有重要的研究价值。本文利用2012~2016年我国A股市场金字塔持股结构的家族上市公司数据,对控制链长度变化与家族真实盈余管理的关系进行实证检验。研究结论表明:家族企业的控制链长度与真实盈余管理程度显著正相关;而依据最终控制人是否为公司创立者的分组检验结果显示,控制链长度与真实盈余管理的正相关关系,仅在非创始人控制的家族企业样本中成立。在采用倾向得分匹配(PSM)方法,进一步分析发现:与非创始人控制家族企业相比,创始人控制的家族企业的盈余管理程度明显更低。

关键词: 控制链长度, 真实盈余管理, 创始人控制

Abstract: From the perspective of the length of the control chain, to explore the impact of pyramid structure on the real earnings management of family business is helpful to further enrich the understanding of pyramid structure, which has important research value. Based on the data of family listed companies with pyramid shareholding structure in China's a-share market from 2012 to 2016, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the change of control chain length and the family's real earnings management. The results show that the length of the control chain is positively correlated with the degree of real earnings management. After grouping the samples according to whether the ultimate controller is the founder or not, this positive correlation still holds in the sample of family business controlled by non-founders, but does not hold in the sample of family business controlled by founders. Using the propensity score matching(PSM)method, further analysis finds that the degree of earnings management of family businesses controlled by founders is significantly lower than that of family businesses controlled by non-founders.

Key words: control chain length, real earnings management, founder control

中图分类号:

F275

李秉祥, 张涛, 陶瑞. 创始人控制、控制链长度与真实盈余管理[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(5): 214-220.

LI Bing-xiang, ZHANG Tao, TAO Rui. Founder Control, the Length of Control Chain and Real Earnings Management[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(5): 214-220.

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创始人控制、控制链长度与真实盈余管理

Founder Control, the Length of Control Chain and Real Earnings Management

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