关键词: 国际气候博弈, 政策预期, 帕累托最优, 财政收支平衡, 全球气候治理

Abstract: This paper firstly modifies the assumptions of the public externality model constructed by Baumol and Oates to build a mathematical model that is more realistic in international climate governance. Subsequently, by solving the mathematical model, this paper deduces the only policy rules that the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) must follow to achieve the optimal balance of global Pareto-optimality and its own financial balance. Finally, based on the above analysis, this paper further constructs an international climate game model that incorporates policy expectations. It reveals that if countries in the world only think about maximizing their own interests, the game equilibrium result will not achieve the global Pareto-optimality of global climate governance.

Key words: international climate game, policy expectations, global Pareto-optimality, financial balance, global climate governance