关键词: 业绩预告, 定向增发, 价格操纵, 中介效应

Abstract: This paper studies whether and how the listed companies manipulate the newstock price according to the different objects of private placement by using the performance forecast. The empirical results show that listed companies according to the different object of private placement release the performance forecast containing different information to affect the issue price strategically, and the strategic performance forecast will have a remarkable intermediary effect, in particular, if the major shareholders to participate in the subscription of new shares, tend to release bad news earnings forecast, to hold down the new share price, and if big shareholders not to participate in the subscription of new shares, tend to release good news earnings forecast, to raise the new share price; Further classified analysis shows that the performance of non-state-owned listed companies is stronger than that of state-owned listed companies and listed companies that actively disclose performance forecast than that of listed companies that forcibly disclose performance, and the intermediary role of strategic performance forecast is more significant. The conclusion of the study provides a certain reference value for investors' investment decisions and regulatory activities.

Key words: performance forecast, private placement, price manipulation, mediation effect