关键词: “三社”融合, 融资机制, 演化博弈, 仿真分析

Abstract: The “three communities” are indispensable and important subjects in the process of China's agricultural and rural development, and are also the backbone force for promoting the organization and materialization of the rural collective economy. The integrated development of the “three communities” refers to the promotion of the high-quality development of China's agriculture and rural areas as the foundation, with agricultural services as the core, through the deep integration of the advantages of farmers' professional cooperatives, supply and marketing cooperatives and credit cooperatives in production management links, market supply and marketing channels, credit service support, etc., to form a joint force to promote the development of rural collective economy, and rationally allocate agriculture-related resources through professional division of labor and efficient cooperation, so as to better promote the development of agricultural modernization and provide strong support and guarantee for the rural revitalization strategy. However, in the process of the integrated development of the “three societies”, the financing difficulties of the integrated development of the “three societies” cannot be effectively alleviated due to the difficulty in controlling the financing risks.
Based on the theoretical research, and the financial thinking of agricultural supply chain, this paper designs the financing mechanism of the integrated development of the “three communities”, constructs the evolutionary game model of the integrated development of the “three communities”, investigates the influence of the “three communities” on the equilibrium of the game with different initial probabilities and key parameter changes under different strategies, and conducts simulation analysis based on the actual situation. The results show that the parameters such as the probability of independent repayment of farmers' professional cooperatives, the liquidated damages and credit penalties of agricultural product order contracts, the discount rate of the purchase amount of agricultural product order contracts, the supervision costs of supply and marketing cooperatives, the loan interest rate of credit cooperatives, and the government risk compensation are the key factors affecting the equilibrium of financing games. Therefore, supply and marketing cooperatives need to strictly supervise whether the loan funds of farmers' professional cooperatives are used for the production process of agricultural products and strictly control the cost of supervision, not to reduce the discount rate of the purchase amount of agricultural product order contracts too much, but to leave enough profit margins for farmers' professional cooperatives, and to increase the liquidated damages and credit penalties for agricultural product order contracts while protecting the profits of farmers' professional cooperatives, so as to increase the restraint on farmers' professional cooperatives, ensure that they perform agricultural product order contracts as promised, and then enable farmers' professional cooperatives to always take the measures. “Cooperation” strategy, supply and marketing cooperatives always adopt the “Guarantee” strategy. For credit cooperatives, it is necessary to increase the risk protection of government risk compensation, appropriately relax the requirements for the loan loss compensation ratio of supply and marketing cooperatives, and increase the probability of independent repayment of farmers' professional cooperatives by establishing credit files, so as to reduce the risk of loan default of credit cooperatives, and finally form a game equilibrium result that makes the “Three Cooperatives” always adopt (cooperation, guarantee, loan).

Key words: integration of the “Three Cooperatives”, financing mechanism, evolutionary game, simulation analysis