关键词: 演化博弈论, 灌溉设施, 共同管护, 集体行动, 乡村建设行动

Abstract: In May 2022, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the Programme for the Implementation of Rural Construction Actions, stressing the principles of “guiding and motivating the participation of farmers” and “integrating the promotion of construction and care”. How to reach a collective action of public facilities management and care, so as to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” has always been an important issue in the field of public resources governance set. This study focuses on rural irrigation facilities and explores the factors affecting farmers’ collective care behaviour through empirical analysis. This study innovatively applies evolutionary game theory to formulate and empirically test hypotheses on factors affecting the realisation of collective care of irrigation facilities. The results of the empirical research are of great significance in guiding farmers to voluntarily participate in the joint management and care of public resources, giving full play to the main role of farmers, realising the effective governance of public resources, and promoting the action of rural construction.
This paper proposes three hypotheses on the factors affecting the realisation of joint care of agricultural irrigation facilities based on mathematical models and evolutionary game theory. One is that it is more difficult to achieve joint care of irrigation facilities in villages with non-farm employment opportunities compared to villages without non-farm employment opportunities. Second, the probability of joint care becoming an evolutionarily stable strategy will be the greatest when incomes among farmers are equal. Third, the effect of village size on reaching joint care of irrigation facilities is uncertain. In this study, two towns (Hongkeli Township and Dalianhe Township) and two townships (Yinglan Korean Township and Yugong Township) in Yilan County, Heilongjiang Province, are selected as the survey area, and 104 natural village leaders in the four townships are randomly selected as the interview subjects for the questionnaire survey. This study uses the Tobit regression analysis model to test the hypotheses.
The results show that: (1)Joint labour opportunities have a significant positive effect on the probability of reaching joint stewardship. (2)Degree of non-agriculturalisation has a significant negative effect on the probability of reaching joint stewardship. (3)The proximity of agricultural income promotes farmers’ participation in stewardship. (4)The relationship between village size and the probability of achieving joint care of irrigation facilities is inverted “U” shape.
Based on the results of the study, the article suggests the following policy implications: improving the punishment mechanism for “free-riding” in various types of common labour, forming a selective incentive system, reducing the difference in farm income between small-scale farmers and large-scale operation, cultivating an ideological system in small-scale villages, and realizing the visibility of individual contributions in large-scale villages are the key to achieving the common management and care of irrigation facilities.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, irrigation facilities, joint management and protection, collective action, rural construction action