关键词: 博弈分析, 在线平台, 消费者隐私, 定向能力

Abstract: The development of the Internet has given rise to the advertising business of online platforms, which can deliver targeted advertisements online based on consumers’ behavior. Since online platforms would serve both consumers and advertisers, and provide two operation patterns, there is a bilateral competition between the consumer market and advertiser market simultaneously. Specifically, in the consumer market, online platforms provide their basic services, such as video on demand, email, etc., while also limiting targeting technology, reducing consumer privacy invasion, and gaining a competitive advantage. On the other hand, in the advertiser market, online platforms improve their targeting ability through investment in targeted technology, and the effectiveness of targeted advertising to gain competitive advantages. The two-sided nature of targeting makes it important to weigh the cost of improving advertising effectiveness and reducing consumer privacy. The balance difficult to coordinate has a huge impact on the revenue and growth of online platforms.
Aiming at this prominent problem, this paper constructs a tripartite game model of online platform, consumers and advertisers in two common market structures (monopoly market and competitive market), and systematically studies the optimal investment, advertising pricing and subscription price of online platform. With a benefit utility profile of online platforms, consumers and advertisers, a mathematical calculation model is built, in the analysis and expansion model of the game stage in the two market structures, the income process of online platforms is simulated, and then by the balance analysis and sensitivity analysis of the benefits of all sides of the market structure, the impact of each factor on the platform income level is investigated. Thus, the decision reference is given under the maximization of online platform income.
The results show that there is a linear positive correlation between the online platform subscription price and platform targeting ability, and the advertising interference cost in monopoly market. Meanwhile, there is a linear positive correlation between the advertising price and targeting ability, while there is a linear negative correlation between the advertising price and advertising interference cost. The higher the advertising interference cost, the less willing consumers are to subscribe for free, and they prefer to pay subscription to avoid advertising interference. Therefore, monopolistic online platforms can charge higher prices. And as more consumers opt for paid subscriptions, they become less attractive to advertisers and advertisement prices fall. The best option for a monopoly online platform is to attract half of the advertising market, and the ratio of paying subscribers to interference cost and targeting power is linearly positive. Advertising interference costs increase platform revenue, which is why monopolistic platforms often run advertisements regardless of consumers’ feelings. In the dual-attribution symmetric competition market for advertisers, the revenue of online platforms will increase with an increase in subscription consumers and differentiation level; on the contrary, the revenue of platforms will decrease with an increase in consumer privacy concerns and targeted technology cost parameters. The decreasing advertising market makes the market competition fiercer, so the revenue of online platforms will decrease. In the asymmetric competitive market, homogenization brings more fierce market competition, and online platforms have lower returns. Platforms with low directional ability will choose to give up directional technology investment. This study proves that the advertising platform in the competitive market under the current operating model mainly derives its income from paid subscribers. If it fails to attract enough paid subscribers, it will fall into losses, which can also be proved by actual market cases.
This study can provide reference and support for the systematic decision-making of online platforms, but the influence of consumers’ behavior on multiple online platforms at the same time needs further research.

Key words: game analysis, online platform, consumer privacy, directional ability