关键词: 服务化转型, 会计信息披露质量, 分析师跟踪, 高管薪酬

Abstract: Based on the information disclosure assessment results of enterprises on the main boards in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2021, enterprises fail to shoulder their information disclosure obligations. If a wrong path to strategic transformation is chosen, the enterprise performance will be greatly impacted, which will lead to the decline in the quality of accounting information disclosure. Theoretically, the impact of servitization on the quality of accounting information disclosure has four effects: scale negative effect, supervision effect, multiple discount effect and difference complementary effect. Which kind of effects takes the lead is still unknown. The contributions of this paper are reflected in the following three points: Firstly, it enriches the research on the factors influencing the quality of accounting information disclosure. The existing research on the quality of accounting information disclosure pays insufficient attention to the transformation of enterprises. This paper measures the degree of servitization from the perspective of output, and studies the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure on this basis. Secondly, it expands the research on the economic consequences of servitization. The existing research mainly focuses on the relationship between servitization and the enterprise performance. This paper combines the strategic management theory and the information disclosure theory, so as to expand the research framework of strategic management and make up for the shortcomings of existing research. Thirdly, it refines the research on the boundary conditions of the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure. Based on the dual perspectives of external supervision and internal incentives, this paper reveals and verifies the boundary conditions of the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure from the perspective of analyst follow-ups and executive compensation.
This paper selects the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2021 as the initial samples. The sample data come from CSMAR and WIND. The data screening process is as follows: (1)delete the samples of ST,^*ST and PT companies; (2)eliminate the samples with missing data; (3)delete the samples of companies whose main business income composition is less than 0 or the total amount is more than 100%. In order to avoid the influence of extreme values, this paper makes a tail reduction of 1% on all continuous variables, and finally retains 11,350 samples. The data are brought into the Logit measurement model, and the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure is analyzed by Stata16.0 software. This paper uses a series of methods to test the robustness of hypotheses, such as the instrumental variable method, propensity score matching method, replacement of the measurement index of the dependent variable, and the relevant conclusions have not changed substantially. Then, this paper verifies the regulatory effects of analyst follow-ups and executive compensation on the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure.
Based on the integration of strategic management theory and information disclosure theory, this paper constructs a comprehensive research framework for servitization, analyst follow-ups, executive compensation and the quality of accounting information disclosure. Based on the dual perspectives of analyst follow-ups and executive compensation, this paper studies the relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure. The main conclusions include: Firstly, there is a U-shaped curve between the servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure. Secondly, analyst follow-ups weaken the U-shaped relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure. Thirdly, executive compensation weakens the U-shaped relationship between servitization and the quality of accounting information disclosure. The management enlightenments of this paper mainly lie in how enterprises formulate the plan for servitization, and improve the quality of accounting information disclosure through servitization.

Key words: servitization, quality of accounting information disclosure, analyst following, executive compensation