关键词: 非国有股东治理, 投资者关系管理, 市值管理, 国有企业, 混合所有制改革

Abstract: With the gradual implementation of the registration system and the introduction of new regulations on “delisting by market value”, the survival of the fittest in the A-share market is accelerating, and small and medium-cap companies will face the dilemma of “no one cares”. Strengthening investor relationship management and improving market value management have become a topic that concerns listed companies. As an important component of China’s capital market, state-owned enterprises (SOE) have the problem of “prioritizing profits over market value”. According to relevant statistics, the overall valuation of state-owned enterprises in China’s capital market is lower than their intrinsic value. The Notice on Matters Related to the Work of Investor Communication of Central Enterprise-Held Listed Companies in 2021 issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council pointed out that “the value creation ability of listed companies has continued to increase, but some companies still have problems such as insufficient attention to investor relations management (IRM), and the ability to convey company value and the storytelling of central enterprises need to be improved”. Existing literature has shown that even if the company’s fundamentals are good, establishing investor confidence through communication is crucial for increasing market value. The market value management of state-owned enterprises should achieve the maximization of market value on the basis of improving their value creation ability.
However, the frequent occurrence of “pseudo-market value management” behavior in China’s capital market, which uses information advantages to manipulate stock prices to deviate from the intrinsic value of the companies, is clearly contrary to the original intention of regulatory authorities to improve the quality of listed companies and maintain the equal rights of all types of shareholders through market value management. Unlike “pseudo-market value management”, IRM serves as a market value management approach that facilitates the protection of small and medium-sized investors’ information rights and enhances the stability of the capital market. Good interaction and communication with investors can help tell a good story about state-owned enterprises to the capital market and prevent the company’s market value from being undervalued. According to relevant data, the overall level of investor relationship management in state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The main reason is that there is insufficient external pressure and internal motivation for state-owned enterprises to communicate with external investors. How to introduce non-state-owned shareholders to participate in governance, and then help state-owned enterprises transition from owner vacancy to owner “in place” to enhance the internal motivation of managers to interact and communicate with investors, and thereby improve the market value and stock pricing efficiency of state-owned enterprises is a research issue worth exploring. The board of directors of listed companies has a significant impact on investor relationship management. Therefore, this article examines the impact of directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders on investor relationship management in state-owned enterprises, and further explores the motivations, mechanisms, and consequences of this influence.
With the listed state-owned enterprises in the Chinese A-share market from 2011 to 2021 as samples, the study analyzes whether non-state shareholders’ governance improves IRM using the OLS model. After robustness and endogeneity tests such as the PSM-DID model, the Heckman two-stage model, replacement of explanatory variables, and consideration of the impact of COVID-19, the main conclusions remain robust. The results are as follows. First, non-state shareholders’ governance has a positive effect on IRM of state-owned enterprises. As the proportion of directors assigned by non-state shareholders increases, the level of IRM increases significantly.Second, the effect of non-state shareholders’ governance is greater for firms with higher stock price crash risk. This result reveals that directors assigned by non-state shareholders promote IRM motivated by stabilizing stock price. Third, directors assigned by non-state shareholders prompt IRM through alleviating agency problems and improving business performance. Ultimately, the market value of state-owned enterprises increases and the degree of undervaluation of market value decreases after improving IRM.
The research contributions of this article lie in: Firstly, existing literature mainly studies the governance effects of non-state-owned shareholders from the perspectives of enhancing internal control quality, increasing accounting information quality, suppressing executive corruption, and improving incentive contracts. This article finds that it can help to promote investor relationship management, enriching relevant researches on the governance effects of non-state-owned shareholders. Secondly, most existing literature takes all A-share listed companies as research samples and finds that various internal governance mechanisms, such as independent directors, affect investor relationship management. This article considers the particularity of state-owned enterprises and finds that non-state-owned shareholder governance is another internal governance mechanism that affects investor relationship management, expanding relevant researches on the influencing factors of investor relationship management. Finally, in the context of the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s clear statement of “cracking down on ‘pseudo-market value management’”, this article has some inspirations on how to promote state-owned enterprises to engage in true market value management.

Key words: non-state shareholders’ governance, investor relations management, market value management, state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership reform