关键词: 规模不经济, 渠道竞争, 侵蚀效应, 收入效应, 平台卖场

Abstract: With the rapid development of the platform economy, a novel e-commerce channel has appeared, that is, the marketplace in which the manufacturers have the opportunity to sell products to consumers directly through the platform (i.e., the platform channel) besides the traditional reseller channel (the indirect one), paying a certain commission fee to the e-commerce platforms, such as Amazon, JD.com and Flipkart. However, in reality, not all e-commerce platforms tend to introduce the marketplace, such as Everlane, Vancl, and Jumei Youpin, that is, e-commerce platforms continue to serve solely as retailers and have not introduced the marketplace channel. The introduction of marketplace has been a subject of interest for researchers and industry experts. Previous research has provided valuable insights that reveal two distinct effects: the revenue effect and the encroachment effect. Specifically, it has been established that the introduction of the marketplace expands the platform channel, thereby contributing to an increase in the overall product demand, as e-commerce platforms charge a certain commission fee from the service, referred to as the revenue effect. However, the introduction of the marketplace will inevitably intensify the competition between platform channel and retail channel, potentially encroaching on the demand within the retail channel, and subsequently diminishing the profits of the retail channel, known as the encroachment effect. Particularly, in situations of manufacturer production diseconomies, an increase in product sales will rapidly escalate the manufacturer’s production costs, making it possible to raise the wholesale price, thereby exacerbating the erosion of retail profits on e-commerce platforms and potentially leading to alterations in the operation strategy.
It is essential to note that, while these effects are widely recognized, existing research has often overlooked the impact of production diseconomies. This represents a critical gap in the current body of knowledge, and addressing this gap is one of the key objectives of this research. This paper integrates how e-commerce platforms make operational decisions under conditions of production diseconomies. Thus, motivated by the observations, the key questions of whether and under what conditions the marketplace channel should be introduced in addition to the reseller channel are raised, we employ a Stackelberg game for a two-level supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, to explore the platform’s channel decisions under the production diseconomies.
Backward induction is employed to address this question as we analyze the changes in the profits of e-commerce platforms when introducing the marketplace or not doing so, thus exploring the optimal strategy for channel operation of e-commerce platforms. Our research reveals the following key findings: (1)For manufacturers, it shows that the manufacturer always has an incentive to join the marketplace channel. (2)For e-commerce platforms, some counterintuitive results are found: whether the platform tends to introduce marketplace channel depends on the manufacturer’s production cost and the commission fee. To be specific, the decision to introduce a platform marketplace depends on the commission rate when manufacturers have fixed unit production costs. When the commission rate is relatively large, introducing the platform marketplace enhances e-commerce profits, making it desirable for the platform to do so; conversely, if the commission rate is low, introducing the marketplace reduces e-commerce profits, making it less attractive. However, when manufacturers face production diseconomies, whether to introduce marketplace is not only influenced by the commission rate but also depends on the degree of production diseconomies. Specifically, when the degree of production diseconomies is large, introducing the marketplace reduces e-commerce platform profits, making the platform less inclined to do so. When production diseconomies are limited, the conclusions align with those under fixed unit production cost conditions: introducing the marketplace reduces e-commerce profits with a lower commission rate and enhances them with a higher commission rate. (3)From the perspective of the supply chain, the introduction of marketplace consistently leads to an overall increase in the profitability of the entire supply chain.
The conclusions drawn in this paper not only elucidate the varying operational strategies of e-commerce platforms, but also provide a certain scientific foundation for optimal decision-making of both e-commerce platforms and manufacturers. Nevertheless, the paper does not consider the impact of uncertain factors such as channel spillover effects and consumer preferences on the operational strategies of e-commerce platforms. Additionally, further research avenues include investigating the choices of operational models for e-commerce platforms in scenarios where manufacturers operate through multiple sales channels simultaneously and in the context of carbon cap-and-trade.

Key words: production diseconomies, channel competition, encroachment, income effect, marketplace