关键词: 区块链技术, 系统动力学, 演化博弈模型, 国有企业审计监管

Abstract: With the deepening of the reform of the state-owned enterprise in China, the problems such as information asymmetry, multiple and repetitive supervision, and the inability to achieve dynamic auditing, which exist in the audit supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprise, have become increasingly prominent. These problems have seriously hindered realizing the “full audit coverage” goal and construction of a“grand pattern of state-owned assets supervision” in China. The new blockchain technology, with features such as decentralization, transparency and traceability, provides an opportunity to address the challenges faced by state-owned enterprise audit supervision. Only some studies have combined blockchain technology with the audit to carry out relevant research, so it is worth analyzing the role of blockchain technology in state-owned enterprise audit supervision and the impact of its cost-sharing ratio on the strategy of audit supervision entities. Moreover, exploring the issue of state-owned enterprise audit supervision from the perspective of blockchain is not only a practical exploration of blockchain technology but also a further innovation and improvement of China’s audit theory and blockchain theory. These research conclusions can better provide theoretical guidance and reference for implementing future blockchain-enabling audit supervision work.
This paper takes the audit supervision process of the state-owned enterprise empowered by blockchain technology as the research object, constructs the state-owned enterprise audit supervision framework under blockchain technology, and discusses the role of blockchain technology in the state-owned enterprise audit supervision process. We use the evolutionary game theory based on the bounded rationality hypothesis of game subjects. An evolutionary game model is constructed, composed of the state-owned enterprise operation, the audit by an auditing institution, and the public supervision. The corresponding replication dynamic equations and respective evolutionary stable points are obtained by using Mathematica 12.0. According to the analytical results, additional drawings of each game player’s related evolutionary phase diagrams are accepted, and the derivative of the dynamic replication equation is used to obtain the stable evolution point of each subject. We get a system of dynamic replication equations by combining the dynamic replication equations of the three-party game entities. The dynamic replication equations are obtained and solved to obtain two equilibrium solutions for the system in the long and short audit supervision processes. Then, we verify the stability of the equilibrium solution under different strategies through the Jacobian matrix and explore the causal relationship of complex systems through the system dynamics theory and the interaction mechanism of strategy selection among various game players. Through the system dynamics simulation software Vensim, a three-party SD model of three game subjects in the audit process of the state-owned enterprise is established. Finally, we verify the rationality and stability of the game model by numerical valuation and simulation analysis methods. We also aim to analyze the influencing factors of the choice of the implementation strategy of the three parties in the game, compare and analyze the changes in the evolution results of each entity, and combine actual phenomena to deeply explore why each entity implements the strategy.
Through sensitivity analysis of the main influencing factors, it is found that the state-owned enterprise is sensitive to the change in the penalties for non-compliance, the audit institution is controlled by reputation loss, and the public is affected by the benefits of active supervision. Based on the simulation results, suggestions are given to improve China’s audit supervision mechanism by increasing the penalties for state-owned enterprise to increase their cost of illegal behaviors, and the occurrence of non-compliance can be suppressed, expanding the loss of audit reputation to make audit institutions conduct legally, and increasing the public monitoring revenue to enhance the enthusiasm of general supervision, so as to attract more people to participate in management. Introducing media as a third party to participate in the evolutionary game process or access enterprise actual data to explore the strategy selection and sensitivity analysis issues of game players may become following future research directions.

Key words: blockchain technology, system dynamics, evolutionary game model, audit supervision of state-owned enterprises