关键词: 供应链企业社会责任, 演化博弈, 系统动力学, 政府补贴, 惩罚机制

Abstract: In this paper, evolutionary game model and system dynamics are combined to explore the decision-making of corporate social responsibility in supply chain under different governance measures. The simulation results show that there is an interaction between the decision-making of enterprises in each link of the supply chain. When one party has a high sense of fulfilling corporate social responsibility the other has a low one. The higher conscious party will eventually tend to fulfill corporate social responsibility regardless of whether there are incentives or not, while the lower one will choose not to fulfill the decision, unless there is a strong incentive. The implementation of incentive measures is more effective for manufacturers when they make decisions on the performance of corporate social responsibility with a neutral attitude. Compared with retailers, manufacturers are more dependent on the market effect brought by consumers' preferences when they fulfill their corporate social responsibilities. Government subsidies are more effective in the short term. The stronger the punishment, the better the incentive effect and the longer the duration. If the two incentive measures are used together, the incentive effect can be better played.

Key words: supply chain corporate social responsibility, evolutionary game, government subsidies, system dynamics, penalty mechanism