关键词: 指数保险市场均衡, 演化博弈, 异质性风险偏好

Abstract: Index insurance, which combines immunity of moral hazard and adverse selection and immediate compensation, has become an important tool for catastrophe risk management. However, the rules of its market equilibrium is still unclear. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-part evolutionary game model of insurance companies, policyholders, and government. Considering the different attitudes of the policyholders in the face of loss and return, the heterogeneous risk preference is included to design the policyholder's decision function. Then, this paper analyzes the evolution path of the index insurance market equilibrium and its influencing factors. The results show that the equilibrium of the index insurance market changes along with its life cycle. The function of government in the index insurance market will move from the manager to the exit, but the subsidy needs to be within a reasonable range, and the government will subsidize the insurance company more effectively. In terms of influencing factors, the policyholders' heterogeneous risk preference has an important impact on the equilibrium evolution of the index insurance market. The sensitivity of loss will accelerate the convergence of the index insurance market to equilibrium; the immediate compensation advantage has the same effect. The spillover effect on non-participating entities delays the achievement of equilibrium. Based on the conclusion, this paper proposes some recommendations for the guidance and encouragement of the index insurance market.

Key words: index insurance market equilibrium, evolutionary game, heterogeneous risk preferences