关键词: 环境规制, 四方博弈, 数值仿真, 演化博弈

Abstract: The problem of environmental pollution has seriously hindered the economic and social development of our country. The current environmental governance in our country has gradually formed a multi-agent governance model. In this paper, the four main related subjects of environmental governance “central government-local government-enterprise-public” are put into a unified framework, and a four party evolutionary game model is established. Numerical simulation is used to simulate the influence of parameter changes on the stability strategies of different subjects in the game system, and the following conclusions are drawn: (1)among the 16 pure strategy equilibrium points of the four party evolutionary game system, there are eight conditions of stability. The other eight equilibrium points are unstable under any conditions. Among them, eight conditional stability points represent the possible strategic equilibrium of the stakeholders in environmental governance in China. The relative net income of a strategy in a strategy set determines the strategy choice of its related subjects. (2)Through the numerical simulation analysis, it is found that increasing the central government's punishment for the local government's negative execution, increasing the central government's transfer payment and increasing the central government's additional punishment for the local government's negative execution can not only improve the environmental protection law enforcement of local government, but also improve the enthusiasm of enterprises in emission reduction. The improvement of environmental regulation standards and the increase of penalties for illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises will have an impact on the strategic choices of local governments, enterprises and the public, which can make the system evolve to the ideal stable state of “the central government does not strictly supervise, the local government actively implements, the enterprises discharge pollutants legally, and the public does not report”, but the effect of improving environmental regulation standards will be slightly better than increasing the punishment to enterprises. The local government's increase of enterprise's pollution control subsidy can help to realize the sustainable development of economy in a short time, but the excessive enterprise's pollution control subsidy will not help the game system to reach the ideal stable state, which is a non long-term environmental governance model. Improving the reward of public report can promote the enterprises to discharge pollutants legally and accelerate the realization of the ideal stable state of the game system to a certain extent. Finally, from the perspective of the central government, local government and the public, the paper puts forward some suggestions on environmental governance.

Key words: environmental regulation, quartet game, numerical simulation