运筹与管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (7): 95-101.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0220

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于第三方监督的地方政府权力清单构建中的演化博弈模型

刘延海1, 包国宪2   

  1. 1.长安大学 理学院,陕西 西安 710000;
    2.兰州大学 管理学院,甘肃 兰州 730000
  • 收稿日期:2015-12-19 出版日期:2021-07-25
  • 作者简介:刘延海(1989-),男,甘肃兰州人,讲师,硕士,研究方向:演化博弈、教育管理;包国宪(1955-),男,甘肃庆阳人,教授,博士,研究方向:政府绩效管理、战略管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点项目(71433005);教育部高校思想政治工作创新发展中心(长安大学)2020年专项课题(20200309);中央高校基本科研业务费课题(300102310651)

The Evolutionary Game Model in the Construction of Local Government Power List Based on the Third Party Supervision

LIU Yan-hai1, BAO Guo-xian2   

  1. 1. School of Science, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710000, China;
    2. School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China
  • Received:2015-12-19 Online:2021-07-25

摘要: 为推进地方政府权力清单制度的有效落实,本文运用演化博弈理论和方法,构建了基于第三方监督的改革者与既得利益者的演化博弈模型,并分别探讨了第三方监督缺失和完全发挥作用条件下,博弈双方的策略选择及其稳定性。结果表明:第三方监督有助于促使改革者选择推行权力清单;同时,第三方监督增加了既得利益者阻止权力清单的成本,促使其选择“不阻止”的策略。因此,须进一步加强居民对改革者和既得利益者的监督。最后,结合数值仿真,对结论进行了验证。

关键词: 权力清单, 演化博弈, 第三方监督, 地方政府

Abstract: In order to promote the effective implementation of the local government power list system, in this paper, we construct a game model of the reformer and the vested interests based on the third party supervision by using evolutionary game theory and method, and discuss the strategy selection and stability of game players with a lack of third party supervision and full play of a role. The results show that the third party supervision helps to promote the implementation of the list of powers of the reformers. At the same time, the third party supervision has increased the cost of the vested interests to prevent the list of power, to make the choice “Not to stop” strategy. Therefore, we must further strengthen the supervision of the residents of the reformers and vested interests. Finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.

Key words: power list, evolutionary game, the third party supervision, local government

中图分类号: