关键词: 信息披露, 网络安全漏洞, 共享平台, 演化博弈

Abstract: Nowadays, the global network threat is becoming more and more serious. As one of the essential reasons of network security incidents, network security vulnerabilities have been paid increasing attention. The disclosure of vulnerabilities has been set up into construction of the national network security emergency system. In this paper, we build a tripartite game model among network security vulnerability sharing platform, software manufacturers and hackers, analyze and simulate the model from the perspective of evolutionary game, and then establish the conditions for the existence of stable equilibrium point. The results of this study show that: there are significant differences between the initial values of different parameters on the results of the tripartite game, the worse the software quality is, the more inclined the platform is to the “closed disclosure” strategy; The payment of vulnerability discoverers has a positive impact on the tendency of software manufacturers to “register members”, and has a negative impact on the tendency of hackers to “strive to attack”; As an increasing disclosure costdisclosure cost, the platform tends to adopt the strategy of “closed disclosure”; The expected loss is too large, and software manufacturers tend to support the “register members” strategy.

Key words: information disclosure, network security vulnerability, sharing platform, evolutionary game