关键词: 协同治理, 区域大气污染, 信任均衡, 演化博弈

Abstract: The degree of trust among local governments in the air basin is a key factor affecting the stability of the collaborative governance relationship of air pollution. Based on the bounded rationality of local governments, an asymmetric trust evolutionary game model of three local governments participating in the collaborative governance of regional air pollution is constructed. On the basis of solving the equilibrium point of the model and analyzing its stability, the evolutionary path of trust in different situations and the influence of the variations of each parameter on trust probability are discussed. This research shows that improving the direct governance benefit, collaborative addition benefit, collaborative indirect benefit, reducing governance risk cost, revealing potential loss, and reasonably determining the amount of ecological compensation can enhance the possibility that the collaborative governance relationship ultimately reaches the state of trust equilibrium.

Key words: collaborative governance, regional air pollution, trust equilibrium, evolutionary game