造船企业与供应商产品质量演化博弈分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0274

运筹与管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 17-24.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0274

造船企业与供应商产品质量演化博弈分析

薛雷^1,2, 戴大双¹

1.大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连 116024;
2.大连船舶重工集团有限公司,辽宁大连 116021

收稿日期:2019-05-14 出版日期:2021-09-25
作者简介:薛雷(1974-),男,河北容城人,正高级工程师,博士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理、项目管理;戴大双(1951-),女,河北青县人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:项目管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772024,71272091)

Study of an Evolutionary Game between Shipyards and Suppliers about Product Quality

XUE Lei^1,2, DAI Da-shuang¹

1. Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;
2. Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Co., LTD, Dalian 116021, China

Received:2019-05-14 Online:2021-09-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 船舶作为大型复杂系统产品,其上游供应商所提供的零部件质量会对最终产品的质量产生重要影响。在考虑造船企业和供应商质量策略和收益的基础上,本文构建了双方的演化博弈模型,对其策略的稳定性开展分析;进一步地,引入了造船企业的动态惩罚措施研究如何对双方的策略产生影响。研究结果表明:(1)造船企业对配套供应商采取产品质量提升措施的奖励和惩罚力度、供应商采取相应措施的收益与成本会直接影响博弈的相关结果;(2)造船企业和配套供应商在三种条件下存在各自的演化稳定策略,同时在一定条件下系统的演化过程呈现周期性质的特征;(3)当造船企业采取动态惩罚措施时,此博弈模型存在稳定的Nash均衡点。研究结果可以为造船企业督促供应商改善供货质量提供决策支持。

关键词: 造船企业, 供应商, 产品质量, 演化博弈

Abstract: As a large complex product system, if the upstream product suppliers of the shipyards always provide the supporting components with quality problem, the overall ship quality will suffer from severe impact, which results in the loss of benefits for the main manufacturer (namely the shipyards). Therefore, how to improve the supporting components' quality of the suppliers is the unresolved problem for the shipyards all the time. In this paper, based on the evolutionary game theory, we combine the shipyards and the suppliers as the main body and formulate the evolutionary game model between them. By introducing the dynamic punishment mechanism of the shipyards, the control strategy of the shipyards is thoroughly analyzed. The results show that punishments and subsidies on suppliers from shipyards, suppliers' benefits and costs can directly affect the game results. Three evolutionary stable strategies between shipyards and suppliers exist and this evolutionary system presents a cyclical characteristic under the certain circumstances. When shipyards implement dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable Nash equilibrium in the mixed-strategy game model. The results can provide decision support for shipyards to urge suppliers to improve product quality.

Key words: shipyards, suppliers, product quality, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F274

薛雷, 戴大双. 造船企业与供应商产品质量演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 17-24.

XUE Lei, DAI Da-shuang. Study of an Evolutionary Game between Shipyards and Suppliers about Product Quality[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(9): 17-24.

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造船企业与供应商产品质量演化博弈分析

Study of an Evolutionary Game between Shipyards and Suppliers about Product Quality

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