关键词: 双边市场, 平台, 销售人员, 激励合同设计, 交叉网络效应

Abstract: Similar to traditional enterprises, the platform enterprise also needs to hire salespersons to carry out promotional activities. However, unlike traditional enterprises, there are cross network effects between users on both sides of the platform. Therefore, whether cross network effects will have impacts on incentive contract design for salespersons in the platform enterprise is an interesting question.
In this article, a principal-agent model is established, in which the platform enterprise decides to hire a salesperson for selling promotion. Specifically, we consider a hard-software platform like Apple iPhone: one side is the end user who wishes to purchase hardware devices (i.e. iPhones), the other side is the developer who provides soft wares (i.e. various kinds of apps). Because of cross network effects, user’s utility on one side will increase as the number of users on the other side rises. Platform enterprises charge fixed fees (i.e. the price of the hardware) to end users and royalties to developers. In order to increase the sales volume of hard wares, the platform decides to hire a salesperson. The utility of the end user who accesses the platform can be augmented through salesperson’s explanation and demonstration. Due to market uncertainty, there is volatility on both sides. In order to motivate the salesperson to make a greater effort, the platform enterprise determines to supply a linear incentive contract consisting of two parts, a fixed wage and the commissions.
This article investigates two types of incentive contracts, i.e. one-sided incentive contract and two-sided incentive contract. In the former scenario, salesperson’s salary is directly linked to direct sales (i.e. the sales volume of hard wares); in the latter scenario, the platform includes the quantity of the other side (i.e. the number of developers) into the incentive contract. The results show that, if agent’s salary is just linked to direct sales, that is, if the platform compensates only for the side where the salesperson exerts efforts, the enhancement of cross network effects may not always be beneficial for the platform. However, if the number of developers is also included into the incentive contract, it will encourage the agent to raise his effort level, and the platform profit will increase.
Unlike classical two-sided market researches, this article considers the separation of ownership from management for the platform enterprise, attempts to open up the “black box” and explores the issue of platform enterprise’s internal management. The research reveals that, the enhancement of cross network effects is not always profitable for the platform when the selling mechanism is considered. Besides, not only the spillover effect and risk transmission generated by cross-group network effects, but also the fee-setting must be considered for the incentive contract design in two-sided markets. The fact that two-sided contracts enable the platform enterprise to gain a higher profit than one-sided contracts indicates that the design of the incentive contracts for salespersons in two-sided markets subverts the traditional idea of “no pain, no gain”. Therefore, based on the research results, we suggest that in industries such as smartphones, firms should abandon the traditional salary incentive mode of “fixed salary+direct sales commissions”, and include indirect sales (this does not need the salesperson to make any efforts) into the incentive contracts, which is adopting a mode of “fixed salary+direct sales commissions+indirect sales”. By allowing salespersons to share risks in both markets of the platform, they are encouraged to make a greater effort and increase the profits of the platform enterprise.

Key words: two-sided markets, platforms, sales forces, incentive contract design, cross-group network effect