关键词: 第三方环境信息平台, 绿色反向保理, 动态收费机制, 演化博弈

Abstract: For the past years, the pollution behavior of small and medium-sized suppliers in the upstream of the supply chain has been frequently exposed, causing great harm to the environment and ruining the reputation of core enterprises,and how to effectively manage it has become an urgent task for the core enterprises. However, because of the wide distribution and complexity of suppliers, core enterprises of supply chain are unable to effectively monitor their suppliers' polluting behaviors and take appropriate measures; at the same time, the lack of capital also restricts the green transformation of suppliers. Core enterprises can leverage third-party environmental information platforms such as “Blue Map” to enhance their ability to monitor supplier pollution behavior; core enterprises can collaborate with financial institutions to implement reverse factoring services that combine supplier pollution information to address suppliers' capital difficulties. In view of this, this paper explores the collaborative governance of core enterprises of the supply chain and financial institutions on supplier pollution problems with the participation of third-party environmental information platforms. The governance scheme based on the degree to which the platform improves the core enterprise's ability to obtain information about their supplier's pollution is proposed, providing practical guidance for relevant parties in collaborative governance.
This paper focuses on the supply chain where the core enterprise is the manufacturer, and selects the bank among the financial institutions as the game subject to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model. Firstly, the governance process is divided into three stages, initial, mid-term and mature, to analyze the asymptotic stability of equilibrium solutions corresponding to different stages, and obtain the strategies of manufacturers, suppliers, and banks at different stages; secondly, the governance scheme is proposed based on the degree to which the platform improves the manufacturer's ability to obtain information about their supplier's pollution; finally, in the process of evolving to the mature stage, the dynamic charging mechanism is designed to promote the implementation of green reverse factoring by banks.
The research has shown that: (1)When the platform effectively improves the ability of manufacturers to obtain pollution information, manufacturers can effectively combine the environmental performance of suppliers with their procurement business, and then collaborate with banks to manage the pollution problem of suppliers. When the improvement is low, increasing the order quantity of suppliers with no pollution information can both promote the evolution of suppliers and banks. (2)The ability of manufacturers to obtain pollution information is an important prerequisite for effectively combining supplier environmental performance with their procurement business and effectively utilizing green reverse factoring, and the proportion of manufacturers applying platforms in the initial stage will affect the role of banks in governance. Therefore, in the early stage of governance, efforts should be made to promote manufacturers to apply platforms. (3)When the extent to which the platform improves the manufacturer's ability to obtain pollution information is high, the dynamic charging mechanism accelerates suppliers' stabilization to strategy for non-polluting the environment and is more effective in scenarios with lower levels of supplier profitability. In contrast, when the degree of improvement is limited and increasing order quantity, the dynamic charging mechanism does not provide a strong impetus to the bank, and therefore does not provide an advantage in governance and becomes less effective in scenarios with lower levels of supplier profitability.

Key words: third-party environmental information platform, green reverse factoring, dynamic charging mechanism, evolutionary game