关键词: 市场规制, 供应链核心企业, 中小制造企业, 演化博弈, 污染治理

Abstract: Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in national economic development, but they have become the main source of environmental pollution. For example, the Apple supply chain pollution incident caused by the environmental problems of the touch screen supplier resulted in poisoning a number of employees, ruining the reputation of Apple and producing a serious negative social effect. It can be seen that how to reasonably and effectively control the pollution of small and medium-sized enterprises has become an urgent problem to be solved.
Scholars' research on pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises mainly focuses on the mode in which multiple subjects outside the industrial chain, such as the government and the public, participate in pollution control independently. However, the resources and strength of the government, ENGO, the public, financial institutions, scientific research institutions and other multiple subjects are limited, and the cost of participating in pollution control alone is high, which leads to an insufficient motivation and poor effect of pollution control. In fact, the information among the subjects within the supply chain is more symmetric, especially the core enterprises have innate advantages in the information of their upstream and downstream small and medium-sized enterprises, and the environmental governance within the supply chain has involved in the research field. There is more communication between the core enterprise and upstream supplier, and the environmental performance of upstream suppliers also affects the reputation and market competitiveness of core enterprises. Therefore, it is easier for core enterprises to supervise and control the pollution control behavior of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. However, the dominant governance of core enterprises often lacks legal constraints. Existing studies have shown that credit resource incentives of financial institutions are the main driving force for core enterprises to fulfill their social responsibilities. Therefore, multiple subjects force small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises to actively abide by environmental laws and regulations and standards through the core enterprises of the supply chain, which has become another important way to promote the pollution co-governance of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. However, there is still a lack of an analysis of the rules of strategy evolution among local governments, core enterprises and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises and the internal mechanism of achieving pollution co-control.
In order to solve the pollution governance dilemma of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, explore the new path of multi-body coordinated pollution governance, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of local government, core enterprises, small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. The internal logic of local government acting on core enterprises through market regulation, and core enterprises using the dominant advantage of supply chain to force small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises to control pollution is analyzed. Besides, the conditions and influencing factors of cooperative governance becoming evolutionary stable equilibrium are analyzed.The research shows that: 1)The lower the cost of core enterprise leading governance and the greater the reputation reward or punishment, the more core enterprise leading governance can be promoted.However, tax incentives play a positive role only when the leading governance cost is more than twice the reputation reward or punishment.2)The green procurement of core enterprises promotes the enthusiasm of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in pollution control.Green credit of financial institutions, as a complementary way to balance the income of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, will play a positive role when the additional income from the increase in procurement is less than two times the governance cost.3)When the net profit of pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises is greater than that of non-control, the media exposure plays a positive incentive role.4)When the cost and benefit of the game parties satisfy certain conditions, the system evolution is stable in the ideal equilibrium state(1,1,1). The research on the tripartite behavior evolution from the perspective of “local government market regulation+core enterprise green procurement” provides a new analytical idea for the coordinated pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises.

Key words: market regulation, core enterprise in the supply chain, the small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, evolutionary game, pollution governance